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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three self-contained chapters on the same topic:
the impact of financial markets on inequality.
The first paper investigates the connection between the increase of equity wealth,
the rise stock-market returns, the slowdown of corporate investment and the de-
cline of the labor share in the U.S. economy. I use a version of the standard
heterogeneous-agent model to explain the connection of these phenomena and I
identify three driving forces. In particular, I show that the fall of the average
marginal tax on capital income, the reduction of stock-market costs and a higher
inclination towards corporate short-termism explain the decrease of investment
and the rise of equity prices. This way, the model predicts an endogenous upsurge
of equity Tobin’s Q and, importantly, the rise of equity returns. The decline of
the labor share occurs in response to investment sluggishness when capital and
labor are complements, which requires an elasticity of substitution consistent with
the values found in the literature. Given the predictions of the model, the paper
solves what Joseph Stiglitz has recently called the Piketty puzzle: why has the
wealth-output ratio and capital returns increased, while wages have not.
The second paper, which is joint work with Pedro Trivin, extends the previous
analysis to a panel of countries. We use a reduced-form framework with wealth
in the utility function to obtain an estimable equation and, by using recent panel
time-series techniques, we find that the increase in Tobin’s Q explain almost 60
per cent of the total decline in the labor share.
The third paper makes a theoretical contribution to recent debate on secular stag-
nation. I use a growth model with imperfect competition to show that the rise
of monopoly rents is consistent with several investment and inequality dynamics
that have characterized the post-1980 stagnant era.
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Chapter 1
Tobin’s Q and Inequality
Abstract
Corporate physical capital and equity wealth have followed divergent trajectories in the
U.S. since the early 1980s. While the equity-wealth-income ratio (Piketty’s β for the
corporate sector) has risen remarkably, the corporate-physical-capital-income ratio has
decreased. Accordingly, equity Tobin’s Q ratio has experienced a secular growth. During
the same period, labor productivity and wages have significantly decoupled from each
other, leading to a decline of the U.S. corporate labor share. I use a version of the stan-
dard incomplete markets model (in the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari tradition) to explain
the connection of these phenomena. I show that the steady fall of the average marginal
tax on capital income, the reduction of stock market diversification costs and the switch
towards higher corporate short-termism explain the decrease of investment flows and the
rise of the market value of existing capital. The consequence is an endogenous upsurge
of equity Tobin’s Q and, importantly, the rise of equity returns, which is also consistent
with U.S. data. Wage-productivity decoupling is the natural response to investment
sluggishness when capital and labor are complements, a result that is consistent with the
values of the elasticity of substitution traditionally found in the literature. The decline
of the labor share, in combination with the resulting evolution of corporate returns and
equity wealth, triggers inequality, offering a joint explanation for observed changes in
the evolution of the factorial and the personal U.S. distribution of income. This paper
turns the attention towards capital income taxation, financial markets and corporate
behavior to solve what Joseph Stiglitz has recently called the Piketty puzzle: why have
the wealth-ouput ratio and the returns to capital increased, while wages have not.
JEL Codes: E22, E25, E44
Keywords: Equity Wealth, Corporate Capital, Tobin’s Q, Inequality.
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1.1 Introduction
Wealth-income ratios have risen astonishingly since the early 1980s in the major
advanced economies, as convincingly shown by Piketty (2014). One of Piketty’s
main arguments connects the rise of wealth-income ratios with the rise in capital
shares. With the standard neoclassical production function, he argues, the only
logical explanation for the observed rise in wealth-income ratios and growing cap-
ital shares would be abnormally low diminishing returns to capital. In terms of
the aggregate production function, this would imply an elasticity of substitution
σ between capital and labor substantially larger than one.
Piketty’s argument has opened a vivid debate in academic circles about the distri-
butional implications of rising wealth-income ratios, the shape of the production
function and the concept of wealth itself. Summers (2014), for example, has crit-
icized Piketty’s estimate of σ (between 1.3 and 1.6) saying that it is not feasible
according to the estimates found in the literature. Rognlie (2014) argues that most
evidence suggests that diminishing returns are powerful enough to cause a decline
in net capital income when more capital is accumulated. More recently, Stiglitz
(2014) has pointed out the necessary distinction between capital and wealth, sug-
gesting that Piketty’s theory is flawed because he conflates both. Piketty’s ar-
gument uses worth as synonym of productive capital. Yet, according to Stiglitz,
the stagnation of wages and the fact that the marginal product of capital has not
gone down would indicate that the accumulation of productive capital, in contrast
to worth, has not been so astonishing. Actual capital-income ratios might have
declined during the last decades, he adds.
Stiglitz’s conclusion is in accordance with the evidence shown by McGrattan
(2015). Using U.S. data, McGrattan shows that the standard measure of pro-
ductive capital K used by macroeconomists, namely fixed assets, follows a pat-
tern very different to capital measured as net worth. In particular, while the
fixed assets-income ratio declined between 1980 and the mid-2000s, the net worth-
income ratio experienced an impressive rise during the same period, just as Piketty
shows. Like McGrattan (2015) states, understanding the difference between the
two aggregates is equivalent to understanding movements over time in aggregate
Tobin’s Q, whose numerator and denominator are net worth and the market value
of physical capital respectively:
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“One, the numerator, is the market valuation: the going price in the
market for exchanging existing assets. The other, the denominator, is
the replacement or reproduction cost: the price in the market for the
newly produced commodities. We believe that this ratio has considerable
macroeconomic significance and usefulness, as the nexus between financial
markets and markets for goods and services.” (Tobin and Brainard, 1977)
The distinction between net worth and fixed assets turns out to be crucial for the
distributional analysis. They are two related concepts, but while the former refers
to wealth in hands of the households and, therefore, includes forms of financial
wealth, the latter only refers to capital with productive capacity. This distinction
becomes even more crucial when the analysis refers to the corporate sector, where
the two categories are mutually exclusive: net worth is the market value of corpo-
rate equities and fixed assets refer to the market value of physical capital owned by
the corporate sector. In order to avoid double counting issues, we should choose
which of the two should be the input K in the aggregate production function. 1
And this choice is not a minor matter from a distributional perspective. Since
they have evolved differently, the degree of diminishing returns able to explain the
evolution of capital and labor share will depend on the definition of capital we are
using.2
In this paper, I build an incomplete markets model in the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari
tradition where I distinguish between physical capital (fixed assets) and net-worth.
I use the model to explain the recent evolution of these two aggregates for the U.S.
corporate sector. In particular, I show that the observed increase in the net worth-
income ratio is compatible with the observed decline of the physical-capital-income
ratio and, therefore, compatible with the decline (rise) of the labor (capital) share
for conventional diminishing returns (i.e. σ < 1). I show that this has to be
the case in an one-sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks and incomplete markets where equity Tobin’s Q rises over time, as occurred
in the United States and in other major advanced economies. As in Anagnostopou-
los et al. (2012), I use a version of the Aiyagari model where, in addition to risky
labor income, households receive capital income from owning shares. Firms decide
on investment and accumulate physical capital. By distinguishing between the
1Note that this is not an issue in the simple theoretical model where Tobin’s Q is equal
to 1. In that case, the market value of assets, which is equal to the expected present value of
dividends, is equal to the cost of replacing the physical capital that generates those dividends.
2When they infer a positive relation between the capital-output ratio and the capital share,
Piketty and Zucman (2014b) use the market value of corporate equities as input K
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ownership of financial capital, which is held by households, and the ownership of
physical capital, which is held by firms, I can study how changes in either of these
two impact the Tobin’s Q ratio and how the distributional implications of these
changes are.
The model predicts that the labor income share and the physical-capital-income
ratio decreases when Tobin’s Q rises. The extent to which this ratio responds
to changes in Tobin’s Q depends, among other factors, on the strength of the
decreasing returns to capital. Moreover, the model is also consistent with an
additional striking feature of the post-1980 U.S. economy: equity returns have
increased with respect to their historical average (McGrattan and Prescott, 2003).
When the market valuation of existing capital rises, shareholders respond by de-
manding a higher return, which in turn forces firms to cut down on investment
to increase the marginal productivity of capital and, thus, the return on equity.
Wage-productivity decoupling and the decline of the labor share are the natural
response to investment sluggishness when capital and labor are, on average, com-
plements. This implies an elasticity of substitution within the range of estimates
found by the literature, which has mostly suggested values below one (Chirinko
and Mallick, 2014a).
This result is starkly in contrast to Piketty (2014). When Piketty deals with the
corporate sector, he does not distinguish between wealth and capital. In his model,
it is net worth what enters into the production function and it is the rise of the
net-worth-income ratio what directly causes the decline of the labor share after
1980, requiring abnormal values of the elasticity of substitution. This is equivalent
to assume that equity Tobin’s Q has been equal to one during the whole period
considered (see Appendix A.4.2 in Piketty and Zucman (2014a)). Data from his
own book, on the contrary, suggest that this is a questionable assumption.3
In my model, the rise of the wealth-income ratio occurs simultaneously to the
decrease in the capital-income ratio. However, as in any standard growth model,
it is capital stock which enters into the production function and what affects the
evolution of the factor shares. In this way, the paper not only explains recent
movements in equity returns and Tobin’s Q ratio, but it also reconciles Piketty’s
data with standard theory, offering a solution to what Joseph Stiglitz has recently
3Piketty (2014) uses aggregate data for the whole economy. His estimate of aggregate wealth
simply sums private and government wealth. But the capital stock of the corporate sector is
included through the equity holdings of households and the government. This means that, with
respect to the corporate sector, the argument that connects the evolution of the factor shares
and the wealth-income ratio uses net equity worth and not productive capital.
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called the Piketty puzzle: why has the wealth-income ratio increased while the
marginal product of capital has gone up and, most importantly, wages have not
increased (Stiglitz, 2014).
The distinction of equity wealth and physical capital is not a mere measurament
dispute about which should be the input “K” in the production function. The
evolution of Tobin’s Q also gives us hints about the drivers of capital-income ratios,
and consequently, about the long-run drivers of factor shares and inequality. In
particular, I argue that the post-1980 evolution of the U.S. equity Tobin’s Q has
been mostly driven by three factors: the steady fall of the average marginal tax on
capital income, the reduction of stock-market costs and the switch towards higher
corporate short-termism. The first two factors are documented with data. The
third factor has been widely discussed in the literature.
Firstly, taxes on corporate distributions (dividends and share buybacks) directly
affect Tobin’s Q causing low equity valuations. McGrattan and Prescott (2005)
find that the large decline in the effective tax rate on U.S. corporate distributions
accounts for the high value of equities in the late 1990s relative to the 1960s. They
also show that the largest decline in taxes happened in the early 1980s. In their
model, however, the tax reduction leaves after-tax equity returns and the capital-
income ratio unaffected. The reason is that they use a complete markets envi-
ronment, in which the supply of capital is completely elastic and the tax burden
falls entirely on the firms, leaving the after-tax return unchanged. In my model,
like in Anagnostopoulos et al. (2012), the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks and incomplete markets guarantees an upward sloping supply of capital,
which implies that any change in Tobin’s Q induced by a lower tax on corporate
distributions rises after-tax equity returns and decreases the capital-income ratio.
This mechanism has been amplified by two additional factors. In the first place,
the costs of holding a diversified portfolio have dramatically fallen in the U.S.
stock market since the early 1980s (McGrattan and Prescott, 2003). In a financial
economy where households trade in shares, stock market costs -measured as a
percentage of total assets held- are equivalent to a tax on financial wealth. The
steady fall of these costs during the last three decades has significantly contributed
to the rise of equity Tobin’s Q, having similar -but non linear- effects to the decline
of capital income taxes.
Finally, I argue that the U.S. corporate sector is today more short-term oriented,
due to a switch towards a more shareholder-oriented corporate model after the
early 1980s (Kaplan, 1997). In the context of the model, I show that this switch
5
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has also impacted the U.S. economy by lowering the capital-income ratio, increas-
ing the stock market value of the corporate sector and raising the U.S. equity
returns. The mechanisms that explain the evolution of the U.S. corporate model
are several.4 Given the difficulty to measure the contribution of each of them, I
opt for a reduced-form friction that makes the stochastic discount factor of the
firm different to that of shareholders. This friction captures the extent to which
the corporate sector maximizes shareholder value by allowing the firm to be more
long-term oriented than shareholders. My argument says that, after the 80s, the
U.S. corporate sector is more short-term oriented than before. This means that
prior to 1980, U.S. firms opted for higher levels of investment and lower payouts to
shareholders. This argument has been widely discussed in the recent literature of
financialization (Lazonick and Sullivan, 2000; Davis, 2009; Mason, 2015; Stiglitz,
2015). But, to my knowledge, it has never been addressed within a neoclassical
growth framework. This reduced-form parameter is calibrated in a residual way:
any change in the Tobin’s Q not attributable to the evolution of capital income
taxation and financial costs is attributed to corporate behavior.
The three factors considered have altered equity Tobin’s Q in the same manner:
raising the equity wealth-income ratio and lowering the capital-income ratio. I call
this mechanism the Tobin’s Q channel to the labor share.5 The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 1.2 documents the decline of the U.S. corporate labor
share and the growth of U.S. equity Tobin’s Q in the post-1980 years. As shown
below, equity Tobin’s Q has been driven by the divergent evolution of the net equity
wealth-income ratio and the corporate physical capital-income ratio. Section 1.3
explains these secular movements using the representation of a capital market that
resembles an incomplete markets economy. Section 1.4 provides empirical evidence
to justify changes in the key parameters of the model. Section 1.5 presents the
4Among the causes that have altered the corporate behavior towards a more shareholder-
value oriented model are i) the extensive use of equity-based executive compensation after 1980
(which has aligned the interests of managers and shareholders) as documented by Bivens and
Mishel (2013), ii) the takeover activity during the 80s and the 90s and the development of a
market for corporate control (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001) and iii) the greater involvement of
institutional shareholders (Gompers et al., 2003). All these three factors are powerful corporate
governance mechanisms that began to play an important role in the early 1980s and that have
pushed equity valuation upwards.
5The model can also confront this channel with the recent theory of the labor share proposed
by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). They argue that the observed decrease in the relative price
of investment goods has induced firms to shift away from labor and towards capital, reducing the
share of labor income. I show, using the approach of Greenwood et al. (1997), that the mechanism
of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) can easily be embedded into a general equilibrium model
like the one presented in this paper. However I leave the computational calculation of the
contribution of this channel for a future version of the paper.
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model. Section ?? presents the calibration of the model to U.S. data and the
quantitative analysis. Section ?? summarizes and concludes.
1.2 Trends in Tobin’s Q and the corporate labor
share
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the U.S. corporate labor share of income. The
aggregate corporate labor share equals total compensation of labor across all the
corporate sector divided by the corporate value added, or wcLc
Y c
, where wc equals
the average wage and Lc equals total hours worked in the corporate sector. Gross
corporate value added Y c equals the sum of compensation paid to workers wcLc,
taxes on production (net of subsidies) and the gross operating surplus, which
captures all the payments to the capital factor, including the consumption of
fixed capital (NIPA Table 1.14). Figure 1.1 shows a secular decline during the last
decades. In particular, the U.S. corporate labor share has declined by 8 percentage
points (which implies an actual decline of 14, 4 %) between 1980 and 2013.
Figure 1.1: U.S. Corporate Labor Share
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I focus on the labor share in the corporate sector for two reasons. Firstly be-
cause, as it has been remarked in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2012), labor share
measured within the corporate sector is not biased by the statistical imputation
of wages from the combined capital and labor income earned by self-employees.
This imputation would be problematic for a consistent measurement of the labor
share. Secondly, the corporate sector is the natural environment to propose a the-
ory that connects the labor share with the evolution of Tobin’s Q. Only within the
corporate sector we have a clear distinction between wealth and capital because
we can easily distinguish between equity-net-worth and corporate-physical capital.
Therefore, we can study the impact that changes in the evaluation ratio Q have
on corporate investment, equity returns and the factor shares. Furthermore, the
mechanisms that alter the Tobin’s Q and I study here (taxes on corporate dis-
tributions, financial intermediation costs and changes in corporate behavior) can
only operate through the corporate sector. This is because they always alter the
relation between the physical capital owned by the firm and the financial wealth
owned by the shareholders.
Figure 1.2: Equity-Wealth-Output and Corporate-Capital-Output ratios
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Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of the corporate-capital-output ratio and the evolu-
tion of the equity-wealth-output ratio. The measure of corporate capital sums all
the nonfinancial assets (produced tangible capital, non-produced tangible capital,
and intangible capital) of the whole corporate sector (financial and non-financial
sectors). I use the series “Nonfinancial assets” in the corporate sector from Piketty
and Zucman (2014a) database. Net-worth sums the market value of equities and
the net-non-equity liabilities (which is the difference between non-equity liabili-
ties and financial assets). Note that for notational convenience sometimes I use
the term equity-wealth to denote net-worth, which apart from equity wealth also
includes net-non-equity liabilities. This is because the model presented below
abstracts from corporate debt and financial assets owned by the firms. This sim-
plification is not problematic. The aggregate “net-non-equity liabilities” is just
another form of financial wealth in hands of the households which is conceptually
similar to equity wealth. Finally, corporate output is the gross corporate value
added from NIPA table 1.14.
In figure 1.2, we observe that, since the early 1980s, the U.S. corporate sector
has been reducing the corporate-capital-output ratio. Meanwhile, the ratio net-
worth-to-output has risen remarkably. Importantly, the corporate-capital-output
ratios seems to show a slight increase since the late 90s. But this is just the effect
of the increase in the market value of capital (in particular, the increase in the
price of structures during the last decade). Figure 1.8 in the appendix shows that
the evolution of the corporate-capital-output ratio in real terms presents a clear
downward trend since the early 80s, which is not reverted by an upward trend in
the late 90s. Nevertheless, the declining trend has ceased in the early 2000s.
The distinction between the nominal and the real value of the capital-output ratio
is important for two reasons. Firstly, to calculate Tobin’s Q we need a measure of
the replacement cost of capital, which is, by definition, a measure of the capital
stock in nominal terms. This is also implied by the model presented below where,
in absence of frictions, Tobin’s Q equals one because the nominal value of capital
and the stock market value of the corporate sector are the same. The second
reason has to do with the factorial distribution of income. When we use the
aggregate production function to get a relation between the factor shares and the
capital-output ratio, we are using the real value of capital stock, which is always
the way capital enters into the production function. This relation is shown below
(equation 1.7). The fact that we input the real value and not the nominal value
is sometimes ignored in standard macro models because they usually assume that
the price of capital goods is not different to the price of consumption goods.
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Equity Tobin’s Q is simply the ratio between the two ratios shown in figure 1.2. In
figure 1.3 we observe that in the years before the early 1980s, the U.S. corporate
sector had a relatively stable equity Tobin’s Q below one, which started to grow to
values close to one from the mid-1990s to the early 2010s. Note that the concern
of this paper is the secular movement of Tobin’s Q during the last decades, but
not its short-run fluctuations, like the one observed in the early 2000s, presumably
due to the dot.com bubble in the stock market.6
Figure 1.3: Tobin’s Q
1.3 Theoretical Analysis
A key result of this paper is that an increase in the wealth-income ratio is com-
patible with a decline of the labor share for standard estimates of the elasticity
6Piketty and Zucman (2014a) calculate Tobin’s “equity” Q as(
Market value of equities
Total assets−NonEquity Liabilities
)
(see their Appendix pag. 28). I prefer to opt for the
traditional form
(
Market value of equities+NonEquityLiabilities−Financial assets
NonFinancial assets
)
for two reasons.
Firstly, because this is ratio I get when I extend my model and introduce corporate debt and
financial assets owned by the firm. Therefore, the model is consistent with this definition.
Secondly, because I am interested in the divergent evolution of financial wealth and physical
wealth. That is why I choose to isolate physical capital in the denominator and gather all the
forms of financial wealth in the numerator. In any case, both forms display a similar evolution.
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of substitution. This section explains graphically why this has to be the case in a
neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets where equity Tobin’s Q rises
over time. I follow Anagnostopoulos et al. (2012) closely in the explanation they
provide about the 2003 capital income tax reform.
To understand the historical movements in Tobin’s Q and in the capital-output
and wealth-output ratios shown above, I use a graphical representation of the
capital market (figure 1.4). Note that the demand of capital Kd(r) is standard and
is simply represented by a monotonically decreasing function of the net return to
capital r. With a standard neoclassical production function, like a CES production
function, this negative relation also holds for the capital-output ratio Kd
Y
(r). This
relation is represented in figure 1.4 by the dark blue curve.
Figure 1.4: Capital Market
The supply of capital is given by the aggregate demand for assets or the stock
of savings S(r). In an economy where households accumulate capital and rent it
to firms, like in the standard Aiyagari model, the market equilibrium is achieved
where the supply of capital intersects the demand of physical capital (intersection
A in figure 1.4). This is not the case in a financial economy where households
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accumulate financial assets and firms accumulate capital. In this type of economy,
what matters for households is the market value of shares (i.e. the supply of equity
wealth), which I denote here byW , and not the market value of the existing capital
stock. In this context, the market equilibrium is achieved when the supply of equity
wealth W (r) intersects the aggregate demand for assets S(r).
In a frictionless financial economy where firms maximize standard shareholder-
value, the stock market value of the corporate sector W would be equal to the
market value of the corporate capital stock K (see the model below). Therefore,
Tobin’s Q, which is the ratio between the two, would equal one. In this simple case,
the two curves K
Y
(r) and W
Y
(r) would overlap and the capital market equilibrium
would resemble the equilibrium in a standard Aiyagari economy.
In an economy where equity Tobin’s Q is lower than one, as we observed historically
for the U.S. economy, the situation is very different. In that case, the market price
of corporate capital K is larger than the stock market value W . Therefore, K
Y
(r)
and W
Y
(r) do not overlap and the curve W
Y
(r) is shifted to the left. The size of the
wedge between K
Y
(r) and W
Y
(r) is given by the magnitude of Tobin’s Q and equals
(1−Q) ∗ K
Y
. Since households only care about the stock market wealth and not
about the replacement cost of corporate capital, the new equilibrium is achieved at
the intersection between the supply of savings S
Y
(r) and the stock market wealth
W
Y
(r). Note, however, that the level of capital corresponding to this equilibrium
remains given by the curve K
Y
(r) at the corresponding equilibrium equity return.
This level is larger than the level achieved in the frictionless equilibrium.
In this paper, following the evidence presented in section 1.2, I argue that the
U.S. economy has transitioned from a pre-1980 equilibrium where Q < 1 to a
post-1980 equilibrium where Q = 1. Note that when this happens, the economy
transits from an "higher capital-output" equilibrium to a "lower capital-output"
equilibrium. During the transition, the wedge between K
Y
(r) and W
Y
(r) closes, and
the economy increases the wealth-output ratio W
Y
and decreases the capital-output
ratio K
Y
. The magnitude of the decrease in the capital-output ratio depends on
the slope of the capital demand curve, which in turn depends on the elasticity of
substitution σ between capital and labor.
Importantly, note that in this type of transition the return to equity increases.
This has been precisely the case for the U.S. since the early 80s. Figure 1.5 shows
that U.S. equity returns, adjusted for inflation, taxes and diversification costs,
12
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have increased with respect to their historical average and have fluctuated around
6% in the post-1980 period.7 The model below is also able to explain this increase.
Figure 1.5: Equity Returns adjusted for Inflation, Taxes and Costs (%), 1960-
2012
Apart from the slope of the demand of capital, the elasticity of substitution σ also
determines the extent to which the labor share responds to capital-output ratio
movements. Note that with an aggregate CES production function, the labor share
is an one-to-one function of the capital-output ratio:
ls = 1− α
(
K
Y
)
σ−1
σ (1.1)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution and α is the standard distributional pa-
rameter of a CES production function. The impact of K
Y
on the labor share ls
depends on σ. If σ < 1, any raise in K
Y
increases the labor share, because diminish-
ing returns to capital are sufficiently high and r does adjust sufficiently downwards
when there is more capital accumulation. The opposite happens when σ > 1. Here
7Ibbotson (2013) provide data for nominal before-tax returns. The following calculation is
done to adjust for taxes, diversification costs and inflation: 1 + rt = 1+r
Ib−τdyIb
pit+1
pit
(1+κ)
where rIb is
nominal before-tax total return and yIb is the income part of total return (which is also provided
by Ibbotson (2013)).
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is where the distinction between stock market wealth and physical capital turns
out to be crucial to understand the impact they have on the factor shares. Piketty
(2014) uses capital and wealth as synonyms. Moreover, he uses the stock market
value of the corporate sector as his measure of corporate capital. This means that,
with respect to the corporate sector, Piketty’s wealth-income ratio β is given by
W
Y
= Q
K
Y
(1.2)
where he abstracts from any valuation effect and assumes that Q has been constant
and equal to 1. Given his finding that β = W
Y
has increased in recent decades,
he therefore assumes the same for K
Y
and concludes that the only plausible expla-
nation for the observed rise in wealth-income ratios and capital shares under the
neoclassical model would be an elasticity of substitution larger than one.
However, evidence shown above indicates that K
Y
has been falling in the U.S.
since the early 80s. This is also what Piketty and Zucman (2014a) find when
they simulate U.S. wealth-income ratios in the absence of capital gains.8 Piketty’s
data shows large increases in the valuation ratio during the period considered but,
surprisingly, his theory of inequality ignores it.
In my model, the return to equity r and the ratios K
Y
and W
Y
move as in figure 1.4
and it is capital stock what enters into the production function. Since K
Y
has been
falling during the period considered, my theory requires a value of the elasticity
of substitution below one, just like the literature has traditionally estimated.
In the next two sections, I examine the causes that are behind the evolution of
equity Tobin’s Q. I provide empirical evidence and a theoretical framework to show
that the wedge between equity wealth and corporate capital has been reduced by
the actual decline of capital income taxes, the decline of financial diversification
costs and the switch towards a short-term oriented corporate model.
I build an incomplete markets model to explain how these factors have changed
equity wealth, corporate capital, equity returns and the labor share after 1980.
Markets incompleteness is an appropiate assumption because when markets are
incomplete the aggregate demand for assets S(r) is increasing in r (indeed, S
is concave and tends to infinity as r approaches 1
β
− 1 due to the precautionary
8Piketty and Zucman (2014a), appendix figure A131
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motive). And an increasing S
Y
(r) curve is needed to obtain the observed movements
in K
Y
and r when Tobin’s Q rises. 9
1.4 Stock Market Costs and Capital Income Taxes
Figure 1.6: Average Marginal Tax Rate on U.S. Dividend Income (%), 1960-
2014
In figure 1.6 I plot estimates of the average marginal tax on divend income for years
1960 to 2012. For the period 1979-2012 I use average marginal taxes calculated by
NBER TAXSIM model with micro data from the Statistics of Income Distribution
of the Internal Revenue Service. For the period 1960-1979, I use average marginal
9Note that in presence of complete markets, however, the stationary demand for assets would
be given by the Euler equation of the representative household evaluated at the steady state.
This would give a steady state demand for assets completely elastic and stuck at r = 1β − 1. In
that case, the equilibrium characterized by Q < 1 would still occur at the intersection between
S
Y (r) and
W
Y (r), but now the economy would not transition towards Q = 1 by lowering
K
Y and
increasing r. It would simply close the gap between KY (r) and
W
Y (r) by increasing
W
Y , leaving r
and KY unchanged, which is at odds with what we observe for the U.S. economy. Anagnostopoulos
et al. (2012) provide a detailed explanation about the difference between assuming complete or
incomplete markets
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taxes calculated by McGrattan and Prescott (2005) using the SOI (Statistics of
Income) data.
Figure 1.7: Equity Mutual Fund Costs (% of Assets), 1980-2014
In figure 1.7 I plot the sum of mutual fund costs and annuitized sales loads relative
to the sum of fund assets. Data are from the Investment Company Institute (ICI).
As in McGrattan and Prescott (2005), I use these data as an estimate of the
costs paid by shareholders to hold a diversified portfolio. Note that the costs are
expressed as a percentage of total assets helds and, therefore, they are conceptually
equivalent to a tax on financial wealth. Both, the average marginal tax rate on
dividend income and the equity mutual fund costs play important roles in the
model explained below. In particular, they lead to a Tobin’s Q lower than one.
Their decline during the post-1980 have contributed to the rise of Tobin’s Q.
1.5 The Model
The model assumes an infinite horizon economy with endogenous production and
uninsurable labor income risk. The economy is populated by a continuum (mea-
sure 1) of infinitely lived households indexed by i that trade in stocks to insure
against idiosyncratic risk, a representative firm and a government that maintains
a balanced budget. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2.... The enviroment
is similar to Anagnostopoulos et al. (2012).
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1.5.1 Households
Households’ have identical preferences over sequences of consumption described
by the expected utility function
U (ci) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cit)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor,E0 denotes the expectation con-
ditional on information at date t = 0 and cit denotes personal consumption. The
utility function u(· ) : R+ → R is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly con-
cave, continuously differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions. Households
can only save in stocks of the firm to insure against idiosyncratic labor income
risk. I denote sit the number of stocks held by the subject i at the beginining of
period t. Stocks can be traded between households every period at a competitive
price pt and they entitle shareholders to a dividend per share of dt. There is no
aggregate uncertainty which implies that the amount of dividends, the price of
stocks and hence the return on the stocks before taxes and costs rbeft =
dt+pt−pt−1
pt−1
are known for the households.
In addition to stock returns, household i earns labor income. I assume that labor
supply is fixed for every households (normalized to one) but their productivity,
it, is i.i.d across households and follows a Markov process with transition matrix∏
(′ | ) where  is derived from a set S of possible values. Individual labor
earnings per period are thus equal to wtit where wt is the aggregate wage rate. The
governement levies proportional taxes on capital income at rate of τd. Households
have to pay stock markets costs which are expressed as a fraction κ of total assets
owned. Since there is a single financial asset in the economy, I abstract from
indiosyncratic risk in assets and, consequently, these costs can be conceived as
costs of holding a diversified equity portfolio, like in McGrattan and Prescott
(2003). Furthermore, because they are expressed as a fraction of total assets held,
from shareholders’ pespective they are conceptually equivalent to a tax on financial
wealth.
Households use their labor income and their after-tax capital income to purchase
consumption goods, to purchase additional stocks and to pay the diversification
costs. Therefore, household i’s budget contraint is:
cit + ptsit+1(1 + κ) = wtit + ((1− τd) dt + pt) st (1.3)
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At each period, hosehold i also faces a no short-selling constraint on stocks:
sit+1 ≥ 0 (1.4)
As it is shown in Coen-Pirani and Carceles-Poveda (2009), in presence of constant
returns to scale in the production function and a no short-selling condition like
1.4, unconstrained shareholders will unanimously agree on the optimal level of
investment and dividends despite the existence of incomplete markets. Note that
perfect unanimity across unconstrained households on shareholder value maxi-
mization implies that any deviation from this objective comes exclusively from
the problem of the firm, and not from a dispute among shareholders with different
objectives.10 This deviation, modelled later in the problem of the firm, can be un-
derstood as resulting from divergent intertemporal preferences between managers
and shareholders.
Households choose how much to consume and how many stocks to buy in each
period given their idiosyncratic labor income, the price of stocks and the level
dividends. Given the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the optimal choice of stocks
by an unconstrained household i requires the following Euler equation to hold:
uc,it
βEtuc,it+1
=
[(1− τd) dt+1 + pt+1]
pt(1 + κ)
= 1 + rt (1.5)
where uc,it denotes the marginal utility of agent i. The expected intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution for all uncostrained shareholders are equal to the
reciprocal rate of the gross return from the stock market between t and t+1. Note
that what matters for the households decision is the after tax return 1 + rt, but
not pt, pt+1 and dt+1 separately.
Using the Euler equation and the transversality condition, the stock price at period
t can be written as a function of the stream of future dividends:
pt =
∞∑
j=1
(
Πj−1h=0
1
(1 + rt+h) (1 + κ)
)
[(1− τd) dt+j] (1.6)
10This is also implied by the fact that constrained shareholders have zero assets, which allow
us to assume null decisional power
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1.5.2 Recursive Formulation of the Firm’s Problem
The representative firm accumulates capital stock Kt, hires labor Lt and uses a
CES technology to produce output Yt:
F (Kt, Lt) =
(
φKθt + (1− φ)Lθt
) 1
θ
where φ and θ are technological parameters. The elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is given by σ = 1
1−θ . Note that according to this formulation, the
labor share of income and the capital-income ratio, key variables in the subsequent
discussion, have an one-to-one relationship whose sign depends on the value of σ :
lst = 1− α(kt)σ−1σ (1.7)
where ls denotes the labor share and k = K
Y
. If σ > 1 diminishing returns to
capital are very low and the capital-to-output ratio and the labor share of income
are negatively related. If σ < 1, diminishing returns are high enough to reduce the
capital share as investment increases, which implies a positive relation between the
labor share and the capital-income ratio. It turns out that σ is not only crucial to
understand the dynamics of the factor shares, but also the impact of the aggregate
capital stock on aggregate welfare since a large proportion of households in this
economy will rely mostly on labor income, which positively depends on K.
The total number of stocks is normalized to one and no other source of external
finance is assumed, namely, there is not new equity or debt issuance. Investment,
the total wage bill and payouts to shareholders have to be financed using only
internal funds.11 The firm’s flow and funds constraint is:
F (Kt, Lt) = dt + γ (Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt) + wtLt (1.8)
where γ is the relative price of investment goods. As in Greenwood et al. (1997),
γ is intended to measure investment-specific technological change. Note that γ is
the key explanatory variable in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014): as the relative
price of investment goods falls, the economy becomes more capital-intensive, the
capital-income ratio rises and -they argue- the labor share declines for σ > 1.
11I do not allow firms to use share repurchases to distribute corporate profits. Dividends are
the only form of corporate payouts
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The optimization problem of the firm is
V (K) = maxd,K′, L {d (1− τd) +m′V (K ′)} (1.9)
subject to
d = F (K,L)− γ (K ′ − (1− δ)K)− wL (1.10)
where m′ is the discount factor of the firm, which equals m′ = ξ βEtuc,it+1
uc,it
and
ξ ∈ [1, 1 + r) by assumption.
Note that under this formulation and due to the presence of parameter ξ, the
optimization of the firm is not consistent with shareholders’ optimization. The
firm discounts future cash flows like shareholders would do only when ξ = 1.
Therefore, the extent to which the firm maximizes shareholder value is given by
the value of ξ. When ξ = 1, the firm maximizes standard shareholder value and the
model collapses to the standard neoclassical model. When ξ ∈ (1, 1 + r), the firm
deviates from the standard shareholder value maximization and overaccumulates
capital. Consequently, the parameter ξ should be interpreted as a reduced-form
mean of capturing divergences between the firm’s and shareholders’ objectives,
where ξ ∈ (1, 1 + r) may arise from a managers’ taste for empire-building or
a preference for investment projects that lead to a “quite life”.12 I argue that
post-1980s institutional changes like the extensive use of equity-based executive
compensation and the development of a market for corporate control have made
corporations more short-term oriented, leading to a lower ξ in post-1980 years.
Importantly, a higher ξ increases firm’s capital stock and, in equilibrium, pushes
the market value down, leading to a lower Tobin’s Q. This is because a higher
value of ξ makes the firm more patient than shareholders’ and, hence, it has a
preference for higher investment and lower return to capital.
Given the difficulty of measuring ξ, it plays a residual role in explaining the sec-
ular movements of Tobin’s Q. This implies that any movement in Tobin’s Q not
attributable to capital income taxes and diversification costs will be attributed to
ξ.
12This is a simple way to model the “control rights valuation” story discussed by Piketty
and Zucman (2014a) (see Appendix A.4.3), which provides an explanation of why countries
with stronger shareholders rights have a higher Tobin’s Q and why anglo-saxon economies have
evolved towards a higher Tobin’s Q during the last decades.
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Labor demand is standard and given by the first order condition with respect to
L:
FL(K,L) = w (1.11)
Capital accumulation is given by the capital Euler equation
γ (1− τd) = 1
1 + r
ξ (1− τd) [FK (K ′, L′) + γ (1− δ)] (1.12)
which results in a demand of capital equal to:
1 + r
ξ
=
Fk (K
′, L′)
γ
+ (1− δ) (1.13)
In equation 1.12, multiplying both sides by K ′ and substituting the one-period
ahead financing constraint into the capital Euler equation gives the following re-
lation for K ′ :
γK ′ =
d′ + γK ′′
(1+r)
ξ
(1.14)
Using forward substitution and imposing the transversality condition, gives:
γKt+1 =
∞∑
j=0
dt+1+j∏j−1
h=0
(
1+rt+h
ξ
) (1.15)
Note that 1.15 gives a formula for the market value of physical capital (i.e. the
replacement cost of capital), which in a frictionless economy is equal to the stock
market value of the firm given by 1.6. The divergence between the two variables
arises due to the presence of capital income taxation (τ d > 0), costly financial
markets (κ > 0) and deviation from standard shareholder value maximization
(ξ ∈ (1, 1 + r)). Crucially for the results of this paper, changes in any of these
parameters will cause opposite movements in equilibrium total wealth held by
households and in equilibrium capital stock. This will affect households differently
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depending on their amount of wealth held. Those holding a large proportion of
assets will benefit from a rise in wealth, even if this growth is at expense of a
decline in the capital stock and the corresponding decline in wages. However,
those holding very little assets will benefit from a rise in capital stock even if this
growth is at the expense of a decline in wealth, since their earnings mainly rely on
labor income.
1.5.3 Government
In each period t, the government consumes an exogenous amount G and taxes
capital income to finance it. Its balanced budget contraint is simply given by
G = τ dd
∫
s(, s)dΨ(, s).
1.5.4 Recursive equilibrium
Let Ψ be the cross sectional distribution of households over the state (, s). This
distribution follows the law of motion Ψ ′′ = Γ (Ψ ′). The stationary distribution can
be used to calculate the aggregate consumption demand
∫
c(, s)dΨ(, s) and the
aggregate demand for stock holdings
∫
s(, s)dΨ(, s). Aggregate capital demand
and aggregate labor demand are given by equations 1.13 and 1.11 respectively.
Definition: Given the transition matrix
∏
, a stationary rcursive competitive
equilibrium relative to the triple
(
τ d, κ , ξ
)
consist of a law of motion Γ, a
stationary distribution Ψ , prices w and p, return r and decision rules for
households c(, s) and s′ (, s), the associated households’ value function
v (, s) such that:
• Given prices w and r and aggregates, the individual policy functions c(, s),
s′ (, s) and the value function v (, s), solve the problem of the households.
• Given prices w and r, aggregate K and L solve the problem of the firm.
• The price of stocks is equal to
p =
(1− τd) d
r + κ
(1.16)
and the level of dividends d is given by the flow and funds constraint of the
firm at the steady state
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d = F (K,L)− FL(K,L)L− γδK (1.17)
• Government spending equals goverment revenue G = τ dd ∫ s(, s)dΨ(, s).
• Prices are such that all markets clear:∫
s(, s)dΨ(, s) = 1 (1.18)∫
dΨ(, s) = L(K) (1.19)∫
c(, s)dΨ(, s) + γ (K ′ − (1− δ)K) +G = F (K,L(K)) (1.20)
Proposition 1.1. In a recursive competitive equilibrium, equity Tobin’s Q satisfies
Q =
(1− τd) ( 1+rξ − 1)
(r + κ)
(1.21)
Proof. This follows from the definition of Tobin’s Q = p
∫
s(, s)dΨ(, s)
γK
, the steady
state condition 1.16, the market clearing condition 1.18, and the fact that the
replacement cost of capital at the steady state is γK = d1+r
ξ
−1 .
When ξ = 1 (standard sharehoder value maximization), κ = 0 (zero stock market
diversification costs) and τd = 0 (no capital income taxes), Tobin’s Q is equal to
one, and the model collapses to the standard neoclassical growth model with a
corporate sector and trading of shares.
In absence of capital income taxes and stock market costs, Tobin’s Q equals
( 1
ξ
+ r
ξ
−1)
r
. When this is the case and ξ ∈ (1, 1 + r), Tobin’s Q is lower than one. By
assumption, ξ cannot be equal to 1 + r because this would imply no-discounting
in the problem of the firm and the steady state replacement cost of capital γK
would tend to infinite. Interestingly, note that nothing prevents ξ to be lower
than one. From an economic point of view, this would mean that managers are
more “short-term” oriented than shareholders. This is not an implausible situation
and, indeed, the tendency to short-termism in current corporate governance has
been an issue of concern in recent policy debates (see for example Martin (2015)).
Results below also suggests that this is a very plausible scenario.
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1.6 Calibration
This section uses a calibrated version of the model for the U.S. economy to study
the distributional effects of the rise in Tobin’s Q during the post-1980 period due
to the steady fall of the average marginal tax on capital income, the reduction of
stock market diversification costs and the switch towards a shareholder-oriented
corporate model.
The time period is assumed to be one year. Households preferences are of the
CRRA class, U (ci) = c
1−µ−1
1−µ with a risk aversion of µ = 2. The production func-
tion is CES, Yt = A
(
φKθt + (1− φ)Lθt
) 1
θ , where φ is a distributional parameter
with value φ = 0.32 and A and θ are technological parameter. The elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor is given by σ = 1
1−θ and equals σ = 0.7.
Note that this value of σ guarantees complementarity between capital and labor.
Therefore, labor share declines when the physical-capital-output ratio declines.
Nevertheless, this estimate is a conservative value of the elasticity of substitution
because the range of values that the literature has estimated for σ is well below
σ = 0.7 (Chirinko and Mallick, 2014a).
Value
µ 2
α 0.32
β 0.93
δ 0.103

[
1 5.29 46.55
]∏∗ [
0.498 0.443 0.059
]∏
(′ | )
 0.992 0.008 0.000.009 0.980 0.011
0.00 0.083 0.917

Table 1.1: Parameters and Earnings Process
The technology parameter A is normalized so that corporate output Y is equal
to one in the steady state of the deterministic version of our economy. I choose
a discount factor β = 0.93 to match the pre-1980 average capital-output ratio of
2.16. The depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.103 as in Anagnostopoulos et al. (2012).
The idiosyncratic labor productivity process is taken from Davila et al. (2012).
They construct this stochastic process to generate inequality measures for earnings
and wealth that are close to U.S. data. As shown in Table 1.1, this is achieved
with a three-state Markov chain with transition matrix∏
=
[
0.498 0.443 0.059
]
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which exhibits very strong persistence, and with productivity values
 ∈
[
1 5.29 46.55
]
that assign productive individuals 46 times the productivity of unproductive indi-
viduals. The resulting stationary distribution is denoted by
∏∗.
I take average marginal tax rates on dividend income τ d from TAXSIM and Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2005). For the pre-1980 period, the average τ d equals
39, 31%. For the post-1980 period, the average τ d equals 20.7%. I take the sum
of mutual fund costs and annuitized sales loads relative to the sum of fund assets
κ from the Investment Company Institute (ICI). For the pre-1980 period, average
κ equals 2.26%. For the post-1980 period, the average τ d equals , 0.7%. Finally,
I calibrate ξ to match the average of equity Tobin’s Q in pre-1980 and post-1980
years.
1.7 Quantitative Results
The aggregate effect of the observed changes in τ d, κ and ξ on the capital-output
ratio, net-equity-wealth-output ratio and the corporate labor share is shown in
table 1.2. To understand the results, first note that model gives equilibria charac-
terized by r and K/Y . Since we observe in the data the Tobin’s Q variation, we
can calculate ξ to obtain the post-1980 -average of- p/y.
σ = 0.7 Pre-1980 equilibrium Post-1980 equilibrium(
τd, κ, ξ
)
(39, 31% ,2.26%, 0.9834) (20.7% , 0.7%, 0.9745)
r 2.98% 6.86%
p
Y
1.1854 1.6032 (+49.48%)
K
Y
2.16 1.6 (−25.92%)
wL
Y
0.712 0.6729(−5.53%)
Tobin′s Q 54.9% 100.2%
Table 1.2: Quantitative Results
The model predicts that the corporate sector has indeed become more short-term
oriented, although, surprisingly, values below one are found for both periods.
Changes in the capital-output ratio and wealth-output ratio are similar in magni-
tude to those observed in the data. More importantly, the model predicts a decline
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of 5.5 percentage points in the corporate labor income share. Since the corporate
labor share had an actual decline of 8 percentage points between 1980 and 2013,
and the Tobin’s Q channel explains a decline of 5.5 percentage points, the change
in Tobin’s Q explains roughly two-thirds of the observed decline in the corporate
labor share.
Conclusion
In this paper I revisit the distributional implications of rising wealth-income ratios.
I first show that, once we control for the valuation effect given by the rise of equity
Tobin’s Q, rising wealth-output ratios are compatible with the decline of the labor
share for standard diminishing returns (i.e. an elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor lower than one). Secondly, I use a version of the standard
incomplete markets model to explain the rise of the net-equity-wealth-output ratio,
the decline of the corporate-capital-output ratio, the decline of the labor share and
the rise of equity returns. Thirdly, I identify the causes that have driven equity
Tobin’s Q up. I show that the steady fall of the average marginal tax on capital
income, the reduction of stock market intermediation costs and the switch towards
a higher short-term oriented corporate model explain the decrease of investment
flows and the rise of the market value of existing capital. The consequence has been
an endogenous upsurge of equity Tobin’s Q and, importantly, the rise of equity
returns. The decline of the labor share is the natural response to investment
sluggishness when capital and labor are complements. The joint effect of capital
income taxes, stock-market costs and corporate short-termism explains up to two
thirds of the decline of the U.S. corporate labor share.
The paper also shows that, by distinguishing between equity and corporate capital,
the evolution of the labor share can be appropriately explained using Piketty’s
data without the need of assuming an extraordinary value on the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor.
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APPENDIX A
Computing the Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
For a given r, the problem of the firm is solved using the first order conditions.
The problem of households is solved using value function iteration. Policy rules
are then used to obtain the stationary distribution and aggregate variables, which
in turn are used to check the market clearing conditions and update prices.
Step 1. Compute the stationary level of employment L
Step 2. Guess the aggregate capital stock K0
Step 3. (Firm’s problem)
Step 3.1 Solve the firm’s problem given an aggregate level of capital K0 and
obtain r0 using equation 1.12.
Step 3.2 Use equation 1.11 to obtain w0 and equation 1.17 to obtain the
steady state level of dividends d0.
Step 3.3 Use equation 1.16 to obtain the steady state stock market value p0
(equity supply)
Step 4. (Households’ problem)
Step 4.1 Use the change of variable ait+1 = ptsit+1 and compute the house-
holds’ decision functions given r0 and w0.
Step 4.2 Compute the stationary distribution of assets Ψ 0 and the aggregate
asset demand E (a)0 .
Step 4.3 Check if E (a)0 ' p0. Note that this condition is equivalent to clear
the stock market since the aggregate asset demand E (a)0 =
∫
p0s(, s)dΨ(, s)
equals the stock market value when the stock market clears
∫
s(, s)dΨ(, s) =
1.
• If E (a)0 > p0, the stock market return r0 is too high and the aggregate
level of capital K0 is too low. Update K with K1 > K0
• If E (a)0 < p0, the stock market return r0 is too low and the aggregate
level of capital K0 is too high. Update K with K1 < K0
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• Update the aggregate level of capital until the equilibrium E (a)0 ' p0
is achieved.
APPENDIX B
Additional figures
(to be commented). To calculate corporate-capital-output ratio for the whole
corporate sector, I proceed as follows. I use the series “Non-Financial assets” from
Piketty and Zucman (2014a), which sums produced tangible capital, non-produced
tangible capital, and intangible capital for the whole corporate sector (financial
and non-financial sectors). Then I use the Chain indexes provided by BEA to get
a real value of the corporate gross value added and the level of corporate fixed
assets.
Figure 1.8: Corporate-Capital-Output Ratio in real terms
28
Chapter 1. Tobin’s Q and Inequality
Figure 1.9: Equity Tobin’s Q, different economies
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Finance and the global decline
of the labour share
Abstract
The labor income share has been decreasing across countries since the early 1980s, spark-
ing a growing literature about the causes of this trend (Elsby et al., 2013; Karabarbounis
and Neiman, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2014a). At the same time, again since the
early 1980s, there has been a global steady increase in equity Tobin’s Q which shows
the increasing trend of asset prices in modern economies. This paper uses a simple
model to connect these two phenomena and evaluates its empirical validation. In our
model a raise in equity Tobin’s Q increases equity returns and, importantly, depresses
the capital-output ratio. The impact on the capital-output ratio reduces the labor share
for standard values of the elasticity of substitution. Based on a common factor model,
we find that the increase in Tobin’s Q explains almost 60% of the total decline in the
labor income share. This implies that financial markets have direct and significant con-
sequences in inequality through their impact on the functional distribution of income.
We highlight the implications of this result and, in the context of the model, we suggest
different policies that can revert this declining trend.
JEL Codes: E25, E44, E22.
Keywords: Labour Share, Tobin Q, Finance, Capital-Output Ratio.
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2.1 Introduction
The decline of the labor income share is becoming an increasing popular research
topic. The constancy of factor shares, once featured among Kaldor’s stylised
facts of economic growth, has been challenged by recent literature. For example,
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) document that the global labor share has de-
clined significantly since the early 1980s, with the decline occurring within the
large majority of countries and industries. Elsby et al. (2013) use alternative mea-
sures of the labor share and provide convincing evidence of this declining trend
for the U.S. economy. More noticeably, Piketty and Zucman (2014a) show, for a
set of advanced economies, a decreasing (increasing) trend of the labor (capital)
income share since the late 1970s.
Figure 2.1.a shows the figure of concern. It displays the evolution of the global
labor share according to our data by plotting the year fixed effects from a GDP
weighted regression along with its 90% confidence intervals. Country fixed effects
are included to eliminate the influence of countries entering and exiting the data
set. Taking 1980 as the reference year, we observe that the global labor share has
exhibited a clear downward trend only disrupted by the sudden -but short- rise in
the early nineties. If we normalised 1980 to equal its weighted average value (57%),
labor share reaches a level of roughly 52% at the end of the sample, implying an
actual decline of 8.9 per cent during the period considered.
Attempts to explain the non-constant behaviour of the labor share have often de-
parted from reconsidering at least two previously standard assumptions namely -
that aggregate technology is Cobb-Douglas and that markets are perfectly com-
petitive. Explanations based on departures from the Cobb-Douglas production
function usually assume that technology is characterised by a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) production function. As long as firms produce with a CES
technology and the labor market is perfectly competitive, the labor share can be
expressed as a function of the capital-output ratio, LIS = g(K/Y ). Given this
relation, this literature emphasizes the role of capital deepening as the main deter-
minant of the labor share. This is the case in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), who
refer to this relationship as the share-capital schedule (or curve). This relationship
is not altered by changes in factor prices or quantities, or in labour-augmenting
technical progress, which are all encompassed in the schedule. Note that within
this curve, when everything else is constant, labor share dynamics can only be
explained if the economy is not on a balanced growth path, meaning that capital
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and output are not growing at the same rate, like in Piketty and Zucman (2014a)
and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
Labor and product market imperfections are also frequently brought up as explana-
tory factors of the labor share decline. Even when technology is Cobb-Douglas,
movements of factor shares can be triggered by changes in the bargaining power of
workers and/or in the monopoly power of firms, that is to say, factors that break
the equality between marginal costs and marginal products/revenues (Raurich
et al., 2012 and Gonzalez, 2016a).
Figure 2.1: Labor income share and Tobin’s Q, 1980-2009
(a) Labour Income Share (b) Tobin’s Q
Notes: Own calculations obtained as year fixed effects from a GDP weighted regression including country fixed effects
to control for the entry and exit of countries throughout the sample.
In light of the previous potential explanatory departures, which are the actual
drivers of the downward trend of the labor share? The literature has pointed
out three potential candidates: (i) globalization, (ii) the institutional framework,
and (iii) structural/technological causes. This paper contributes to the debate
by exploring the role played by a new factor: the negative impact of finance on
corporate investment, commonly referred as the financialization process of the non-
financial corporate sector, which we connect with the global evolution of equity
Tobin’s Q.
The presence of globalization as a driving force candidate is not surprising. The
unprecedented global integration process that economies have experienced during
the last decades has substantially altered many economic relationships. With re-
gard to the distribution of income, from a theoretical perspective, globalization
has an ambiguous effect. On one side, the relative larger capital mobility makes
easier for a company to change the location of its production. The change of
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location can decrease the labor share by the simple elimination of jobs. In ad-
dition, given the increasing international competition, firms can also use this as
a threat to decrease the bargaining power of workers (Rodrik, 1997) and, thus,
the labor income share. On the other side, globalization has a counterbalance
effect by increasing product competition. This increase in competition decreases
firms’ mark-ups, and this can have a positive impact on the labor income share.
Therefore, impact of globalization is something that has to be empirically evalu-
ated. Guscina (2006) and Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) find a negative relationship
between globalization and the labor income share in developed countries. In their
analysis, they include different globalization proxies such as: international trade,
trade with developing countries, offshoring, and the export/import relative prices,
finding a robust negative relationship.1 More recently, Elsby et al. (2013) study
the role played by the offshoring process in the U.S. labor share decline. They
find that the increased exposure to imported goods accounted for 85% of the total
decline in the past quarter century. Therefore, empirical studies suggest a negative
impact of globalization on the labor share of income.
The role of the institutional framework has also received a strong attention in
the study of factor share dynamics. The literature has focused on the impact of
both labor and product market regulations. Kristal (2010), for example, finds
that dynamics of the labor share are largely explained by indicators for workers’
bargaining power. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) emphasize that labour market
regulations have a positive effect in the short-run, but negative in the long-run,
because in the long-run employers can substitute capital for relatively more expen-
sive labor. With respect to product market regulations, Raurich et al. (2012) find a
negative relationship between imperfect competition and the labor share, showing
that estimates of the elasticity of substitution are biased when price mark-ups are
ignored. Finally, Azmat et al. (2012), investigating a different channel, find that a
fifth of the total labor share decline observed is a consequence of the privatization
of public companies through job shedding.
Despite the documented importance of globalization and market regulations, most
of the current literature has focused on structural/technological explanations. This
branch of the literature relies on the aforementioned one-to-one relation between
the labor share and the capital-output ratio LIS = g(K/Y ), where the direction
of the effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour.
1It is worthy to note that both papers find that technology has played a more important role
than globalization.
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The contribution of this literature relies on looking at structural drivers of the la-
bor share by making endogenous the dynamics of the capital-output ratio. Piketty
and Zucman (2014a), for example, argue that a persistent gap between the rate
of return to capital and the growth rate of output results in a growing accumula-
tion of capital because capitalists save most of their income. This would explain
the observed movements of the factor shares in advanced economies. Also based
on the share-capital schedule, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) argue that the
persistent global decrease in the relative price of investment goods has induced
firms to use more capital at the expense of labor, increasing the accumulation of
physical capital and depressing the labor income share. They model capital-biased
technological change using a version of the model presented in Greenwood et al.
(1997).
Note that although Piketty and Zucman (2014a) and Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) emphasize different channels, both use the share-capital schedule and have
the common view that the increase in the capital-output ratio has been the main
cause of the recent trend of factor shares. In response to higher capital accumu-
lation, and due to low diminishing returns, the return to capital has not adjusted
sufficiently downwards and this has led to an increase in the capital share. In
mathematical terms, this is equivalent to say that the elasticity of substitution
is larger than one. Only when capital and labor are, in the technological sense,
substitutes enough, can capital be accumulated without decreasing much its rate
of return.
This degree of substitutability, however, has seldom been found in the empirical
literature. Economists have often estimated values of the elasticity of substitution
(σ) far below one (Antràs, 2004; Chirinko, 2008).2 Notably, Chirinko and Mallick
(2014a) using a sectoral dataset and combining a low-pass filter with panel data
techniques, find an aggregate elasticity of substitution of 0.4. Furthermore, when
they allow the elasticity to differ across sectors, they find that all the sectoral values
are below 1. In the context of the current debate, they convincingly argue that
the secular decline in the labor share of income cannot be explained by decreases
in the relative price of investment, or by any other mechanism that increases the
capital-output ratio.3
2Chirinko (2008) provides a summary of the empirical literature and lists estimates from
different papers, concluding that ”the weight of the evidence suggests that gross σ lies in the
range between 0.40 and 0.60”
3Most of the criticisms of Piketty’s Capital have emphasised this point, like Rognlie (2015)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2015)
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In this paper we contribute to this recent literature by proposing a new mecha-
nism and by evaluating its empirical validation with recent panel data techniques.
Our mechanism emphasizes the role of finance and the relation between financial
markets and corporate behaviour. In particular, we argue that the widespread
increase in equity Tobin’s Q has occurred at the expense of corporate investment
and the labor income share. We provide a simple model which shows that when
equity Tobin’s Q raises, the equilibrium capital-output ratio falls. Importantly,
this fall has a standard impact on the labor income share because it requires a
value of the elasticity of substitution in line with the estimates traditionally found
in the empirical literature.
Although the modelling strategy is different, our theoretical argument is similar
to Gonzalez (2016b). When equity Tobin’s Q raises, financial wealth raises ac-
cordingly and, to hold this additional wealth, investors demand a higher return on
equity. In any standard model, like ours, equity returns are linked to the marginal
productivity of capital. This implies that if firms are forced to increase the return
on equity, they have to reduce investment on capital. This circumstance depresses
the capital-output ratio and has a direct impact on the labor share.4
Note that the mechanism of our model makes use of the share-capital schedule:
we impact the labor share through changes in the capital-output ratio. In that
sense, our paper is close to structural/technological explanations like the mecha-
nism proposed by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). However, in our model the
movement along the share-capital goes in the opposite direction. In response to
an increase in equity Tobin’s Q, investment and the capital-output ratio fall, not
raise, and equity returns raise, not fall. This way, our the mechanism suggests
that it is not too much investment what causes the decline of the labor income
share, like in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), but too little, making our model
compatible with standard values of the elasticity of substitution (i.e., σ < 1).
The relation of our paper with Piketty and Zucman (2014a) is more subtle. On one
hand, they emphasize the role of increasing capital-output ratios in explaining the
recent evolution of capital and labor shares. This makes their contribution closer
to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). On the other hand, they calculate corporate
4In an unpublished but illustrative manuscript, Michele Boldrin and Adrian Peralta-Alva
realized that corporate capital stock and market value of corporate equity were negatively cor-
related in U.S. data between 1951 and 2001. They find a correlation coefficient of -0.73 and they
considered this finding a puzzle which cannot be solved by any standard theory. Our model shows
that, when the demand of assets is increasing in equity returns, there is not any puzzle. The
slides of the unpublished draft are available at http://www.micheleboldrin.com/research/
buscycles.html
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capital using the stock market value of equity holdings. That is, they assume that
Tobin’s Q is equal to one and proceed by equating the market value of physical
capital to the stock market value of the corporate sector. However, they emphasize
the important role of asset prices in driving the evolution of capital-output ratios
and, for a set of advanced economies, they show a clear upward trend of equity
Tobin’s Q during the last 35 years. Furthermore, and consistent with our theory,
they find declining or stagnant trends when they calculate corporate capital-output
ratios using the PIM method and, not surprisingly, they estimate that, in absence
of capital gains, national wealth-income ratios would have remained stagnant or
declined.5
Our theory gives rise to several questions: Does the raise of Tobin’s Q capture the
impact of finance on factor shares? What is behind the global evolution of Tobin’s
Q? And more importantly, is it a relevant mechanism?
We certainly do not argue that Tobin’s Q is a perfect indicator of financial activity
and we neither try to show that Tobin’s Q is a variable that captures the whole
impact of finance on the capital-output ratio and the factor shares. We simply
check the empirical validation of a model that shows that when Tobin’s Q raises,
the equilibrium capital-output ratio and the equilibrium labor share fall.
Our mechanism is relevant but, to the best of our knowledge, empirically unex-
plored. It is first relevant because it resembles the widely discussed arguments
used by the literature on financialization (Epstein, 2005; Davis, 2009), which has
recently been connected with the evolution of factor shares (Stockhammer, 2013)
and inequality in general (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). This literature stud-
ies the increasing role of financial markets and financial motives within the non-
financial corporate sector. In particular, it emphasises mechanisms that raise
equity wealth and corporate payouts but depress corporate investment, just like
in our model.
There are different mechanisms whose impact can be encompassed through an
increase of equity Tobin’s Q. Among them, financialization literature has empha-
sized the role played by the short-termism and increasing search of ”shareholder-
value”. According to this literature, corporations, after the early 80s, tend to
pursue short-term payout policies that increase the equity price but that happen
to reduce long-term investment (Stiglitz, 2015). However, there are other mech-
anisms which can also increase the price of equity and reduce the investment on
5See data for different countries in Piketty and Zucman (2014a), Appendix Figures A71,
A92, and A129, available on line at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capitalisback.
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physical capital. These are, for example, the decrease of dividend income tax
rates, the decline of stock market transaction costs and the rise of monopoly rents
(Gonzalez, 2016a and Gonzalez, 2016b). Any of these mechanisms can be em-
bodied in a version of the model we present below. The important aspect is that
they all impact the equilibrium capital-output ratio and the labor share through
an increase in equity Tobin’s Q. For this reason we prefer to abstract from any
specific factor and focus on the impact of Tobin’s Q alone.
Figure 2.1.b shows the evolution of global Tobin’s Q according to our data by
plotting the year fixed effecs from a GDP weighted regression where 1980 is taken
as the reference year (1980 = 0). If we consider the weighted average value in
1980, Figure 2.1.b shows a steady Tobin’s Q increase from a value below 1.2 to
values around 1.7 in 2007.
Figure 2.2: Labor income share against Tobin’s Q
Notes: Own calculation based on a sample of 41 countries and 911 observations.
Variables are demeaned to control for fixed-effects. Correlation coefficient= −0.28.
Figure 2.2 is more illustrative. It shows a negative correlation between the labor
income share and the Tobin’s Q when we control for country fixed effects. It is
therefore the figure that better anticipates the answer to our research question.
For our empirical analysis, we rely on recently developed panel time-series tech-
niques that account for macroeconomics data characteristics. In particular, we
present different Mean Group-style estimators which rely on a common factor
model approach. Importantly, with this empirical approach we can deal with unob-
servable heterogeneity while we also control for the panel-time-series characteristics
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of macro data (i.e., cross-section dependence and nonstationarity) in a tractable
way. 6 This is particularly important given the nature of our data. The existence
of multiple potential unobservable factors and potential cross-section dependence
makes this method particularly appropriate for us. Furthermore, country-specific
impact of our variables of interest can be obtained. We opt to further control
for the relative price of investment goods to compare our mechanism with that of
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).7
Our results show a robust and significant negative impact of Tobin’s Q on the
labor income share. Our preferred estimate indicates that Tobin’s Q can explain
up to 57% of its decline since 1980. However, we do not find any significant impact
of the relative price of investment goods. Like Chirinko and Mallick (2014a), our
results suggest that the decline of the labor income share cannot be explained by
the secular decline of the relative price of investment goods.
Since Tobin’s Q impacts the labor share through an endogenous decline of the
capital-output ratio, our results reconcile the secular decline in the labour income
share with standard values of the elasticity of substitution. This is starkly in con-
trast with the explanations given by Piketty and Zucman (2014a) and Karabar-
bounis and Neiman (2014). We consequently conclude that deep causes for the
secular decline of the labor share have to be found not in the mere accumulation
of physical capital or in capital biased-technological changes, but in the way finan-
cial markets and corporations relate. In particular, the deep causes for factorial
inequality should be found in policies or institutional changes that have increased
financial wealth at the expense of real investment.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops the
theoretical framework relating the Tobin’s Q with the labor income share. Section
2.3 introduces and explains the data used in our empirical analysis. Section 2.4 and
2.5 present, respectively, the econometric methodology and the results. Section
?? summarises and concludes.
6For a detailed review of these recent estimators, see Eberhardt and Teal (2011b); ?
7Changes in the relative price of investment goods impacts the capital-output ratio but they
do not change the Tobin’s Q because Tobin’s Q adjusts accordingly. This can be seen in Gonzalez
(2016b)
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2.2 Theoretical framework
This section presents a model that connects the labor share with financial wealth,
physical capital stock and the Tobin’s Q. We consider a representative agent
economy where households accumulate financial wealth and receive direct utility
from the ownership of wealth. The firm accumulates physical capital and distribute
dividends to households.
2.2.1 Households
There is a representative household whose maximisation problem is the following
(in recursive form):
V (s) = max
c,s′
c1−µ
1− µ +
γ(p−1s)1−θ
1− θ + βV (s
′) (2.1)
s.t. c+ ps′ = w + (Qd+ p)s,
where, c represents consumption, w is the average wage, d is the amount of divi-
dends distributed in the current period, p is the price of stocks and s represents
the amount of stocks owned today. The term p−1s is simply a measure of wealth,
where p−1 is given for the household and s is a state variable which was decided
yesterday. Q represents the fraction of dividend income received by the house-
holds. At every given period there is one equity share outstanding. Hence, market
clearing in the market for shares requires s = 1 for any period.
The first term of the utility function is the standard Constant Relative Risk Aver-
sion (CRRA) formulation of consumption utility. The second term, proposed by
Carroll (1998) and used by Reiter (2004) and Piketty (2011), says that investors
derive utility from the ownership of wealth (p−1s) and not merely from consump-
tion. A similar specification of wealth in the utility function has been recently
used in Kumhof et al. (2015). The inclusion of wealth in the utility function is an
essential aspect of the model because, as it is shown later, it allows to obtain an
increasing demand for assets, which turns out to be crucial for the comparative
statics of the model.
In a frictionless economy, households receive the total amount of dividends dis-
tributed by the firm and Q equals one. In our case, we assume that there is a
constant fraction of the dividend income 1−Q which does not go to households.
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An obvious example of this type of friction is a capital income tax which detracts
from households a constant fraction of dividends. However, other frictions, like
financial transaction costs, can be thought similarly. In this context, the return
on equity is given by 1 + r = Qd+p
p−1
.
We show later that Q is exactly the equity Tobin’s Q. This is the simplest way
to have a Tobin’s Q different from one and, for this reason, we opt for it. In this
simple case, Tobin’s Q is constant along the whole domain of equity returns.8
We can simplify the problem of the household by using a change of variable. Let a′
denote the value of assets acquired by the representative household at the current
period. The problem becomes:
V (a) = max
a′
[(1 + r)(a)− w − a′]1−µ
1− µ +
γa1−θ
1− θ + βV (a
′), (2.2)
where a′ = ps′ and 1 + r = Qd+p
p−1
.
The intertemporal first order condition with respect to a′ gives the Euler equation:
c−µ = β[(1 + r′)c′(−µ) + γa′(−θ)], (2.3)
and its corresponding steady state formulation:
1 = β[(1 + r) +
γa−θ
c−µ
] (2.4)
Note that at the steady state, consumption equals the flow of total interests plus
total wage, c = ra+w. Given this Euler equation, we can express the steady state
demand of financial wealth like:9
a =
[r−µ − βr−µ − βr1−µ
βγ
] 1
−θ+µ (2.5)
8There are other modelling strategies to achieve a Tobin’s Q different from one, which ratio-
nalise other frictions. Gonzalez (2016b) shows that stock market costs and different stochastic
discount factors between managers and shareholders can also give rise to an equity Tobin’s Q
different from one. Gonzalez (2016a) shows that similar effects can be obtained assuming im-
perfect competition. The impact on equilibrium capital-output ratio, however, is similar in the
sense that when Tobin’s Q raises the capital-output ratio always declines.
9For simplicity we do not include w in the steady state equation. This simplification would
be equivalent to a model where, in addition to the problem of the shareholder, there is a represen-
tative worker with perfect inelastic supply where wages are simply determined by the marginal
productivity of labor.
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Proposition 2.1. The steady state demand of financial wealth is an increasing
function of the return r for 0 < r < ( 1
β
− 1) if µ ≥ 0 and θ > µ.
Proof. The derivative of a with respect to r is:
∂a
∂r
=
[r−µ − βr−µ − βr1−µ
βγ
] 1
−θ+µ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term A
[−µr−µ−1 + βµr−µ−1 − β(1− µ)r−µ
βγ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term B
1
−θ + µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term C
For βγ > 0, term A is positive if 0 < r < ( 1
β
−1). Term B is negative for any value
of r between 0 and 1
β
− 1 if µ ≥ 0. Accordingly, to have ∂a
∂r
> 0 along this range
of returns, term C has to be negative and, therefore, θ > µ must be satisfied.
Summing up, when r is below 1
β
− 1, the steady state demand of financial assets
is monotonically increasing with respect to capital return if µ ≥ 0 and θ > µ.
Interestingly, an increasing steady state demand of financial assets shows that us-
ing wealth in the utility function within the representative agent framework can
be interpreted, for a range of realistic parameter values, as a reduced form for
precautionary savings. Indeed, in the standard incomplete markets model, which
is often used to model precautionary behaviour, the aggregate demand of assets
is increasing and r < 1
β
− 1 is satisfied in equilibrium.10 Although accumulating
wealth for precautionary behaviour is a plausible interpretation for the shape of
a(r), other interpretations are also possible. For example, people might also de-
rive direct utility from wealth accumulation due to the social status conferred by
wealth (Piketty, 2011). Or people might accumulate wealth for dynastic altruism,
that is, to leave a bequest to their descendants. Whatever the interpretation, by
using wealth in the utility function, we get an increasing demand for financial
assets, which, as shown below, is crucial for the results of the paper. This is in
contrast with the standard model where only consumption is included in the utility
function and that, according to Carroll (1998), is unable to explain households’
saving behaviour. In that case, wealth disappears from the Euler equation and the
steady state demand of assets becomes perfect elastic at 1
β
− 1. Finally, note that
according to our specification, marginal utility is decreasing both in consumption
and in wealth, but the restriction θ > µ means that it diminishes less rapidly in
consumption.
10Although concavity is not required for the desired result, it turns out that it is also satisfied,
as Figure 2.3 shows.
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From now onwards, the steady state demand of financial assets will be expressed
as a(r), where:
a(r) =
[r−µ(1− β)− βr1−µ
βγ
] 1
−θ+µ
, (2.6)
and:
∂a(r)
∂r
> 0; ∀r < 1
β
− 1 if θ > µ and µ ≥ 0.
2.2.2 The Firm
The representative firm accumulates physical capital K, pays the wage bill w and
uses a CES technology to produce output Y :
Y =
[
φK(
σ−1
σ
) + (1− φ)L(σ−1σ )
] σ
σ−1
, (2.7)
where φ is a distributional parameter and σ is the elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital. The labor share of income LIS can be expressed in terms of
the current period capital-output ratio (K
Y
):
LIS = 1− φ
(K
Y
)σ−1
σ
, (2.8)
where the sign of ∂LIS
∂K
Y
depends on whether σ is higher or lower than one. In
recursive formulation, the problem of the firm is:
V (K) = max d+m′V (K ′) (2.9)
s.t. d = F (K,L)− (K ′ − (1− δ)K)− w,
where δ accounts for the depreciation rate of capital. The firm’s discount factor
is:
m′ =
βuc′
uc − βva′ =
1
1 + r′
, (2.10)
which makes the problem of the firm consistent with the problem of the households.
Given that, the firm solves:
V (K) = maxF (K,L)− (K ′ − (1− δ)K))− w + 1
1 + r′
V (K ′), (2.11)
.
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The FOC with respect to K ′ is
FK′(K
′, L′) = δ + r′, (2.12)
from where we obtain a standard demand for capital K ′(r), which is decreasing
in the level of capital returns. Using the transversality condition, the constant-
returns-to-scale assumption (which is satisfied under a CES technology) and aban-
doning the recursive formulation, we can express total capital stock as a function
of future dividends.
Kt+1 =
∞∑
j=0
dt+1+j
Πj−1h=1(1 + rt+h)
, (2.13)
.
From the definition of equity returns, Qd
′+p′
p
= 1 + r′, the stock price (p) can
be expressed, using forward substitution, as a function of the future stream of
received dividends:
pt =
∞∑
j=0
Qdt+1+j
Πj−1h=1(1 + rt+h)
(2.14)
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the stock market value to the replacement cost of capital.
Using the expressions above, Tobin’s Q results in:
Qt =
pt
Kt+1
, ∀t (2.15)
Note that under this specification, Tobin’s Q is constant along the whole domain
of equity returns. Since the demand of capital has been obtained from the problem
of the firm, the value of financial assets is:
p(r) = QK ′(r)
2.2.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the capital market would occur at the intersection between p(r) and
a(r). Since a(r) is monotonically increasing and p(r) is monotonically decreasing,
there is a unique equilibrium characterised by the return to equity (r∗) given by:
p(r∗) = a(r∗) (2.16)
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Note that since the capital demand is monotonically decreasing with respect to
the return, there is a single level of capital corresponding to r∗. We denote this
level K∗(r∗). Importantly, the equilibrium p(r∗) = a(r∗) depends on Q. If Q
is larger, then the equilibrium equity return would be higher because investors
would demand a higher return to hold the additional financial wealth. Therefore,
the equilibrium level of r depends positively on Q.
When Q changes, there is a change in equilibrium r∗, but also a change in the
amount of physical capital demanded by the firm. Figure 2.3 is illustrative at this
point. When Q grows, the gap between p(r) and K(r) becomes smaller and r∗
raises because the equilibrium is moving upwards along a(r). In response to it,
the firm will tend to decrease the amount of physical capital to raise the return on
equity, which from equation (2.12) is directly linked to the marginal productivity
of capital. Therefore, we can express the equilibrium level of capital K∗ in terms
of r∗, and subsequently, in terms of Q:
K∗(r∗(Q)) = K∗(Q) (2.17)
Figure 2.3: Market for capital
Notes: The curves a(r), p(r) and K(r) are built using standard parameter values:
µ = 2, θ = 3, σ = 0.9. Tobin’s Q is assumed to be constant, like in the model, and
equal to 0.6.
Proposition 2.2. The relation between Tobin’s Q and equilibrium capital K∗ is
negative.
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Proof. Since p(r) = QK(r), the equilibrium condition p(r) = a(r) can be ex-
pressed as G(K,Q) = 0 where G(K,Q) = a(r(K))
K
− Q. Applying the implicit
function theorem, we have that dK(Q)
dQ
= −
∂G
∂Q
(K∗,Q)
∂G
∂K
(K∗,Q)=
−(−1)
∂a
∂r
∂r
∂K
K∗−1−a(r(K∗))K∗−2 . Since
∂a
∂r
is positive and ∂r
∂K
is negative, dK(Q)
dQ
has to be negative.
The equilibrium of the model makes explicit the relation between the capital level
of equilibrium and the Tobin’s Q. Since the labor share depends on the capital-
output ratio (see equation (2.8)), we can make explicit the relation between the
equilibrium labor share and Tobin’s Q:
LIS∗ = 1− φ
[ K∗(Q)
Y ∗(K∗(Q))
]σ−1
σ
, and
∂LIS
∂Q
=
∂LIS
∂K
Y
∂K
Y
∂K
dK(Q)
dQ
, (2.18)
where:
∂LIS
∂K
Y
> 0 if σ < 1;
∂K
Y
∂K
> 0 due to CRS;
and
dK(Q)
dQ
< 0 given by proposition 2.2.
Importantly, the mechanism proposed here works through the capital-output ra-
tio, that is, Tobin’s Q impacts the labor share through its effect on investment and
capital. In that sense, as remarked before, our model is in the spirit of Karabar-
bounis and Neiman (2014). In particular, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) build
a model to explain the decline of the labor income share with recent movements in
the relative price of investment goods. Their mechanism can be easily embedded
into our model by adding the relative prices of capital goods (rpt) in the budget
constraint of the firm, like in Greenwood et al. (1997).
F (K,L) = d+ rp[K ′ − (1− δ)K] + w, (2.19)
where the demand of capital is dependent on rp, and more specifically, it raises
when the relative price of capital goods falls, that is, ∂K
′(r)
∂rp
< 0. We empirically
evaluate the potential impact of this mechanism compared to ours.
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2.3 Data
In order to empirically study the relationship between the Tobin’s Q and the labor
income share, this paper combines three different databases.
2.3.1 Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q is the market value of capital over its replacement cost. We use data
from Worldscope Database to calculate the Tobin’s Q as the market value of the
sum of equity and non-equity liabilities over the sum of their book value, which
is generally acknowledged as the most accurate available procedure, given the
difficulty to obtain data of the replacement cost of capital. Chung and Pruitt
(1994) find that a simple market-to-book ratio explains at least 96.6 per cent of
the variability of Tobin’s Q -calculated as the market value of capital over its
replacement cost.
We aggregate firm level data from publicly traded companies following Doidge
et al. (2013) methodology. That is, in a first stage firms are clustered in 17 different
sectors using the Fama-French 17 industries classification, where a median Q is
computed for each industry. Countries’ Q are calculated as the market value
weighted average of the median industries’ Q. The use of industry medians let us
overcome the problem of potential outliers in the sample.
2.3.2 Labor income share
Regarding the LIS, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) have developed a database
of the corporate labor income share for a considerable number of countries obtain-
ing the data from several sources. However, the use of their database would force
us to exclude a non-negligible number of countries in our analysis. As an alter-
native, we lean to use the LIS variable from the Extended Penn World Table 4.0
(EPWT 4.0).
The EPWT 4.0 draws information from different United Nations sources and mea-
sures the labor income share as the share of total employee compensation in the
Gross Domestic Product with no adjustment for mixed rents, and without distin-
guishing the corporate sector. Although we are aware of the potential drawbacks
from using this LIS definition, the correlation with the corporate labor share and
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the total labor share used by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) is 0.87 and 0.96
respectively (Figure 2.4). We consider this a safe level in order to use our variable.
Figure 2.4: EPWT LIS vs KN LIS
(a) EPWT vs Corporate Labour Share (b) EPWT vs Total Labour Share
2.3.3 Relative prices
The relative price of investment goods with respect to consumption goods is ob-
tained by extending Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) database.
In order to obtain the relative price in domestic terms, we divide the country-
specific relative price obtained from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Pii
Pci
), which is
calculated using ppp exchange rates, over the relative price of investment in the
United States (PiUS
PcUS
). We then multiply this ratio by the ratio of the investment
price deflator to the personal consumption expenditure deflator for the United
States ( IDUS
PCDUS
) obtained from BEA.
RP =
Pii
Pci
PiUS
PcUS
∗ IDUS
PCDUS
2.4 Empirical methodology
Beyond the theoretical relationships, we face the challenge of carrying out a robust
estimation of the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the labor share. This section
explains in detail (i) how we go from the theoretical model to an empirical equation,
and (ii) the empirical tools which allow us to infer a causal relationship.
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2.4.1 Empirical implementation
For empirical purposes, we do not impose a specific production function and,
therefore, we do not restrict the functional form of the labor share to be the one
derived from a CES technology. We simply assume a general multiplicative form
where changes in the capital-output ratio have an impact on the labor share:
LIS = g
(K
Y
)
= a
(K
Y
)α
(2.20)
This way, our empirical specification is similar to Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003).
Note that we remain agnostic about α and then we do not know ex-ante whether
the impact of K
Y
on the labor share is positive or negative.
Nevertheless, contrary to Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), we further endogenise
the capital-output ratio. Our model shows that the equilibrium capital-output
ratio depends, among other things, on the Tobin’s Q, and that the sign of this
relation is negative. However, and again for empirical purposes, we do not impose
a particular relation derived from the specifics of the model. Rather, we also
assume a general multiplicative form where the capital-output ratio is expressed
as a function of Tobin’s Q. Following Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), we also
include the relative price of investment goods (RP ) as an argument of K
Y
.
K
Y
= f(Q,RP ) = Qψ1RPψ2 (2.21)
We use these two forms to obtain an estimable equation of the labor share in terms
of Q and RP :
LIS = g
(K
Y
)
= g(f(Q,RP )) = a(Qψ1RPψ2)α (2.22)
Taking natural logarithms:
log(LIS) = log(a) + αψ1 log(Q) + αψ2 log(RP ) + µit, (2.23)
or simplifying:
lisit = β0 + β1qit + β2rpit + µit (2.24)
Where lis, q, and rp are the natural logarithm values of our variables of inter-
est, and µ is a standard error term. Note that according to proposition 2.2 and
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expression (2.18) we expect β1 to be negative. The sign of β2 is expected to be
negative if, as we assume in the model, σ is lower than one and capital and labour
and complements. In that case, an increase in the relative price of capital goods
depresses investment and this impacts negatively on the labor share. However, if
we follow Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), we should expect β2 to be positive
because declines in the price of capital induce firms to shift away from labour and
toward capital, driving the labour share down.
Figure 2.5: Tobin’s Q against relative prices
Notes: Own calculation based on a sample of 41 countries and 911 observations.
Variables are demeaned to control for fixed-effects. Correlation coefficient= −0.09.
We are not concerned about multicollinearity. The figure above shows that the
correlation between Tobin’s Q and the relative prices of investment is very low,
illustrating that the two mechanisms are very different.
2.4.2 Econometric methodology
Characterized by a small number of cross-sectional units (N) compared to the time
dimension (T), macroeconomics panel data have been traditionally estimated fol-
lowing microeconomics panel data techniques under the assumptions of parameter
homogeneity (across countries), common impact of unobservable factors, cross-
section independence, and data stationarity.11 However, if these assumptions are
11See Roodman (2009) for a detailed explanation on the potential risks of the popular Differ-
ence and System GMM estimators.
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violated, results would be subject to misspecification problems. In order to over-
come these potential sources of misspecification, we rely on recently developed
panel data techniques (panel time-series), which have been especially developed
for macroeconomics data characteristics (Pesaran, 2015).12
Our empirical framework is based on a common factor model (for details, see
Eberhardt and Teal, 2011a, 2013a,b). Formally, assuming for simplicity an one-
input model, a common factor model is as follows:
yit = βixit + uit, uit = ϕift + ψi + εit, (2.25)
xit = δift + γigt + pii + eit, (2.26)
ft = τ + φft−1 + ωt, gt = µ+ κgt−1 + νt, (2.27)
where yit and xit represent, respectively, the dependent and independent variables,
βi represents the country-specific impact of the regressor on the dependent vari-
able, and uit, apart from the error term (εit), contains unobservable factors. In par-
ticular, unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity is captured through a country
fixed effect (ψi), while time-variant heterogeneity is accounted through a common
factor (ft) with country-specific factor loadings (ϕi). At the same time, the model
allows the regressor to be affected by ft or other common factors gt, which repre-
sent i) unobservable global shocks (e.g., oil prices or financial crisis) that affect all
the countries -although with different intensities- and ii) local spillovers (Chudik
et al., 2011; Eberhardt et al., 2013). The presence of the same unobservable factor
(ft) as a determinant of both the independent and the dependent variable raise
endogeneity problems which complicate the estimation of βi (Kapetanios et al.,
2011).13
We can see the previous common factor model as a general empirical framework
which encompasses several simpler structures. In particular, we can classify the
models between “Homogeneous models”, where the impact of the regressors on the
dependent variable is common across countries (i.e., βi = β), and “Heterogeneous
models”, which leave the coefficients unconstrained (i.e., βi is estimated for each
12Although empirical applications of these methods are still not widespread in the literature,
it is worthy to acknowledge the valuable contribution made to the field by Markus Eberhardt
and coauthors in the last years. The empirical methodology of this Chapter relies on several of
their papers.
13Equation (2.27) models these factors as a simple AR(1), where no constrains are imposed
to get stationary processes. Note that nonstationarity could provoke a spurious relationship
between our variables of interest. If our variables are nonstationary, we have to analyse the
cointegration relationship among them to infer any causal relationship.
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country). In the latter case, the estimator is defined as the simple average of the
country-specific estimators (i.e., β∗ = N−1
N∑
i=1
βi).
Within each group, the assumptions about the structure of the unobservable fac-
tors leads to different estimation methods. For the case of homogeneous estima-
tors, we consider the common Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS), the Two-
way Fixed Effects (2FE), and the Pooled Common Correlated Effects (CCEP)
estimators. While the first two are standard in the literature and account for un-
observable heterogeneity through time and country dummies, the CCEP estimator
has a more flexible structure, which allows for a different impact of the unobserved
factors across countries and time.14 Empirically, it eliminates the cross-sectional
dependence by augmenting equation (2.24) with the cross-section averages of the
variables.15
With regard to heterogeneous models, we consider different Mean Group estima-
tors. In particular, we present the results for the Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean
Group estimator (MG), the Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects Mean
Group estimator (CMG), and the Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Dynamic CMG
estimator (CMG2).
Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group estimator (MG) allows for a country-
specific impact of both the regressor and the unobservable heterogeneity. The
impact of the last one is assumed to be constant, and is empirically accounted by
adding country-specific linear trends (t). Therefore, the estimable equation takes
the form:
lisit = β
MG
0i + β
MG
1i qit + β
MG
2i rpit + β
MG
3i t+ Ωit (2.28)
where βMGj = N−1
N∑
i=1
βMGij . As explained before, the MG estimator is computed
as the simple average of the different country-specific coefficients, which are calcu-
lated by regressing the previous equation for each country. However, although it
overcomes the potential misspecification from assuming parameter homogeneity,
the introduction of country-specific linear trends could be too simple to rule out
all the possible cross-section dependence from the unobserved heterogeneity.
In this sense, Pesaran (2006) proposes the Common Correlated Effects Mean
Group estimator (CMG), which is a combination of the MG and the CCEP es-
timators. In particular, it approximates the unobserved factors by adding the
14POLS and 2FE estimators assume that the time-varying heterogeneity has the same impact
across countries for a given year.
15Eberhardt et al. (2013) provide the intuition behind this mechanism.
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cross-section averages of the dependent and explanatory variables, and then run-
ning standard panel regressions augmented with these cross-section averages. In
this case, the estimable equation is:
lisit = β
CMG
0i + β
CMG
1i qit + β
CMG
2i rpit (2.29)
+ βCMG3i list + β
CMG
4i qt + β
CMG
5i rpt + Ωit (2.30)
where βCMGj = N−1
N∑
i=1
βCMGji . It is easy to see that the first line is the Pesaran
and Smith (1995) MG estimator (without linear trend), and the second line is the
way the Pesaran (2006) CMG estimator approximates the unobservable processes.
So far, we have discussed how to deal with different sources of misspecification like
the assumption of parameter homogeneity or the existence of cross-section depen-
dence. This paper also analyses potential misspecification arising from a possible
dynamic structure of the relation under study by estimating both static and dy-
namic specifications. Although Pesaran (2006) CMG estimator yields consistent
estimates under a variety of situations (see Kapetanios et al., 2011; Chudik et al.,
2011), it does not cover the case of dynamic panels or weakly exogenous regressors.
Chudik and Pesaran (2015) propose an extension of the CMG approach (CMG2)
to account for the potential problems arising from dynamic panels. In particular,
they prove that the inclusion of extra lags of the cross-section averages in the
CMG approach gives a consistent estimator of both βi and βCMG. Empirically, we
proceed by using an Error Correction Model of the following form:
∆lisit = β
CMG2
0 + β
CMG2
1 lisi,t−1 + β
CMG2
2 qi,t−1 + β
CMG2
3 rpi,t−1 + β
CMG2
4 ∆qit + β
CMG2
5 ∆rpit
+ βCMG26 ∆list + β
CMG2
7 list−1 + β
CMG2
8 qt−1 + β
CMG2
9 rpt−1 + β
CMG2
10 ∆qt + β
CMG2
11 ∆rpt
+
p∑
l=1
βCMG212 ∆list−p +
p∑
l=1
βCMG213 ∆qt−p +
p∑
l=1
βCMG214 ∆rpt−p + Ωit,
where the first line represents the Pesaran and Smith (1995) MG estimator, the in-
clusion of the second gives the Pesaran (2006) CMG estimator, and the three lines
together are the Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Dynamic CMG estimator (CMG2).16
Likewise, given the way they control for unobservables, CMG style estimators are
suitable for accounting for structural breaks and business cycle distortions, making
the use of yearly data perfectly valid in order to infer long run relationships.
16Chudik and Pesaran (2015) recommend to set the number of lags equal to T 1/3. We consider
up to 2 extra lags of the cross-section averages.
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2.5 Results
In order to give a systematic view of our results, this section is divided in four
subsections. Subsection 2.5.1 presents an exhaustive analysis of the time-series
properties of our variables of interest. Subsection 2.5.2 shows the results for a
baseline model, where just Tobin’s Q is considered as a regressor. Subsection 2.5.3
further includes the relative price of investment in the analysis, and Subsection
2.5.4 provides evidence supporting the interpretation of our results as a causal
relationship.
2.5.1 Time-series properties
The order of integration and potential cross-section dependence in the data play a
central role in panel time series. In order to deal with potential problems, Tables
2.1 and 2.2 analyse, respectively, the order of integration and the cross-section
dependence of the variables used in our analysis.
Regarding the order of integration, Table (2.1) presents the results for two speci-
fications of the Pesaran (2007) cross-sectional augmented panel unit root (CIPS)
test. In particular, panel 2.1.a) shows the results when a constant is included
in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions, while 2.1.b) also includes a
deterministic trend.
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Table 2.1: Unit root tests
a) Pesaran (2007) CIPS test: Constant
Lags lis (p− value) q (p− value) rp (p− value)
0 0.431 0.667 -2.744 0.003 -0.118 0.453
1 -0.207 0.418 -2.405 0.008 -0.141 0.444
2 -1.199 0.115 0.103 0.541 0.655 0.744
3 1.802 0.964 2.942 0.998 2.254 0.988
4 5.477 1.000 6.091 1.000 7.211 1.000
b) Pesaran (2007) CIPS test: Constant and deterministic trend
Lags lis (p− value) q (p− value) rp (p− value)
0 1.044 0.852 -2.068 0.019 2.483 0.993
1 0.390 0.652 -1.628 0.052 2.052 0.980
2 -0.033 0.487 1.304 0.904 0.998 0.841
3 5.280 1.000 6.785 1.000 6.006 1.000
4 8.090 1.000 8.949 1.000 9.127 1.000
Notes: Pesaran (2007) CIPS test values are obtained from the standardised Z-tbar statistic. H0 = nonstationarity.
Lags indicates the number of lags included in the ADF regression.
Pesaran (2007) CIPS test belongs to a 2nd generation of panel unit root tests, which
are characterized by allowing potential cross-section dependence of the variables.
CIPS test proposes a standardized average of individual ADF coefficients, where
the ADF processes have been augmented by the cross-sectional averages to control
for the unobservable component.
Table (2.1) presents the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test values along with their cor-
responding p − value for our three variable of interest. “Lags” indicates the lag
augmentation in the Dickey-Fuller regression. Given that the null of nonstation-
arity is only rejected in 4 out of 30 cases, we can safely assert that the variables
under analysis are nonstationary.
54
Chapter 2. Finance and the global decline of the labour share
Table 2.2: Cross-section dependence tests
a) Levels: b) Diff:
Variable lis q rp Variable ∆lis ∆q ∆rp
CD-test 16.73 29.76 42.37 CD-test 12.99 34.45 6.66
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
corr 0.132 0.250 0.345 corr 0.11 0.296 0.049
abs(corr) 0.472 0.394 0.558 abs(corr) 0.235 0.349 0.223
c) Het. AR(2) d) Het. AR(2) CCE
Variable lis q rp Variable lis q rp
CD-test 9.93 33.58 3.40 CD-test -0.24 -0.66 -2.38
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 p-value 0.81 0.51 0.02
corr 0.088 0.301 0.027 corr -0.006 -0.011 -0.023
abs(corr) 0.243 0.344 0.213 abs(corr) 0.220 0.237 0.213
Notes: CD-test shows the Pesaran (2004) cross-section dependence statistic, which follows a
N(0, 1) distribution. H0 = cross-section independence. corr, and abs(corr) report, respectively,
the average and average absolute correlation coefficients across the N(N−1) set of correlations.
Table 2.2 shows the Pesaran (2004) CD test for cross-section dependence in panel
time-series data. This test uses correlation coefficients between the time-series for
each panel member and has proved to be robust to nonstationarity, parameter het-
erogeneity and structural breaks even in small samples.17 Table 2.2 is divided in
four different panels representing different transformations of the variables. Panels
a) and b) show the CD test for the levels and growth rates of our variables. The
null hypothesis of cross-section independence is rejected in all the cases. Panels
c) and d) present the results when the test is applied to the residuals of an au-
toregressive regression of order 2 (AR(2)) of each variable. The difference between
the two is that, while regressions in panel c) are estimated by the Pesaran and
Smith (1995) Mean Group estimator, Panel d) shows the results when the AR
process is augmented with cross-section averages in the spirit of Pesaran’s (2006)
CMG estimator. The difference between both shows the power of the cross-section
averages to control for unobservable cross-section dependence.
The presence of nonstationary variables and cross-section dependence in our data
make the use of traditional panel data techniques invalid. To be sure that our
17The test is computed as:
CD =
√
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
√
Tijρij ,
where ρij represents the correlation coefficient between country i and j, while Tij is the number
of observations used to computed that correlation.
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regression results are not subject to biases due to cross-section dependence or
to spurious relationships due to the order of integration, we will pay specially
attention to regression residuals’ characteristics. In particular, in our preferred
specification residuals are stationary (which is an informal test for cointegration
among the variables) and they do not have problems of cross-section dependence (
which indicates that unobservable heterogeneities are successfully captured in the
model).
2.5.2 Baseline results
Tables 2.3 and 2.4, present the results for our baseline model, where just the im-
pact of Tobin’s Q on the labor income share is studied. Columns [1] - [4] display
the homogeneous-type estimators, where β is constrained to be the same across
countries. We present results for the standard OLS estimator with time-dummies
(POLS), the 2FE estimator and the CCEP estimator, with and without including
a country-specific linear trend. Columns [5] - [7] present the heterogeneous-type
estimators. In particular, we show the estimates for the MG, and the CMG es-
timator with and without country-specific trends. As we have explained before,
country-specific regressions are estimated and the final estimator is the average of
the country-specific coefficients.18
Table 2.3 presents the estimates corresponding to a static model, where we consider
41 countries and 915 observations.19 Regarding the homogeneous-type estimators,
we find a negative and significant impact of the Tobin’s Q on the labor income
share in all but the POLS estimator (where the impact is positive and significant).
However, CIPS and CD tests indicate that the residuals present nonstationarity
and cross-section dependence. That is to say, [1] to [4] regressions are suffering
from some type of misspecification, which from our discussion before could be:
(i) the imposition of parameter homogeneity, (ii) an unsuitable structure of the
unobservable heterogeneity, or (iii) that the nature of the relationship is not static.
The importance of the first two potential sources of misspecification can be tested
analysing the Mean Group-style estimators (columns [5] - [7]). A negative and sig-
nificant impact of the Tobin’s Q on the labor income share is still present, ranging
from −0.053 to −0.06. However, although the residuals present an improvement
18Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the Mean Group-style estimators will produce consis-
tent estimates of the average of the parameters.
19Table A.1 in the appendix shows the specific countries and period under analysis.
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in terms of absolute correlation, we still observe cross-section dependence. Sta-
tionarity in the residuals is now present in 2 out of the 3 regressions. These results
indicate that, although the introduction of parameter heterogeneity improves the
specification, it is not enough to solve all the potential misspecification problems.
Table 2.4 analyses the third potential source of misspecification through the es-
timation of a Partial Adjustment Model (PAM), where the first lag of the de-
pendent variable is included as a regressor. Due to data restrictions, we consider
40 countries with the number of observations ranging from 850 to 885. The first
important result is that a clear negative and significant long-run relationship is
observed between the Tobin’s Q and the labor share irrespective of the estimator
under analysis. The second remarkable fact is that most of the residuals show
cross-sectional independence and stationarity, indicating the absence of the previ-
ous source of misspecification. Given its flexibility to control for the unobserved
factors, our preferred model is the one showed in the last column (CMGt2)) which
represents the Chudik and Pesaran (2015) Dynamic CMG estimator, where 2 ex-
tra lags of the cross-section averages are included in the regression to control for
the potential dynamic bias. We observe that a 1% increase in Tobin’s Q decreases
the labour income share in the long-run by 0.08%.
2.5.3 The Effect of the Relative Price of Investment Goods
As explained before, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) have argued that the
global decline in the labor share can be explained, at least partially, by the decrease
in the relative price of investment goods. They estimate that the lower price of
investment goods explains roughly half of the observed decline in the labor share.
In this section we test their hypothesis by including the relative price of investment
goods in our regressions and compare their mechanism with our Tobin’s Q channel.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the results.
Table 2.5 displays th results from the static model. The inclusion of the relative
price of investment does not alter the negative relationship found between the
Tobin’s Q and the labor share. With respect to their effect, they present a nega-
tive impact under the homogeneous-type estimators. However, once we allow for
parameter heterogeneity, they no longer show any kind of influence on the labor
income share. Nevertheless, similar to the static model analysed in Table 2.3,
residuals present cross-section dependence and nonstationarity.
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Table 2.6: ECM with relative prices
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
2FE CCEP MG CMG CMGt CMGt1 CMGt2
list−1 -0.176 -0.395 -0.449 -0.5 -0.694 -0.72 -0.812
(0.026)*** (0.049)*** (0.034)*** (0.053)*** (0.061)*** (0.085)*** (0.125)***
qt−1 0.011 -0.012 -0.035 -0.039 -0.067 -0.076 -0.058
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014)** (0.018)** (0.026)** (0.028)*** (0.033)*
rpt−1 -0.032 -0.016 0.064 0.15 0.092 0.129 -0.005
(0.024) (0.040) (0.070) (0.091)* (0.115) (0.166) (0.186)
∆q -0.031 -0.033 -0.038 -0.038 -0.051 -0.053 -0.058
(0.014)** (0.015)** (0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)***
∆rp -0.141 -0.214 -0.021 0.049 0.093 0.05 -0.11
(0.050)*** (0.056)*** (0.065) (0.108) (0.099) (0.107) (0.095)
t 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant -0.106 -0.301 -0.273 -0.277 -0.431 -0.356
(0.018)*** (0.033)*** (0.050)*** (0.084)*** (0.089)*** (0.124)***
Number of id 30 30 30 30 30 29 26
Observations 732 732 732 732 732 700 631
R-squared 0.26 0.59
RMSE 0.0264 0.0224 0.0191 0.0142 0.0127 0.0101 0.0067
Trends 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.23
lr-q 0.0621 -0.0307 -0.0779 -0.0785 -0.0965 -0.1061 -0.0718
se-q 0.0739 0.0357 0.0327 0.0374 0.0388 0.0405 0.0422
lr-rp -0.1826 -0.0405 0.1417 0.2999 0.1325 0.1796 -0.0063
se-rp 0.1306 0.1016 0.1573 0.185 0.1661 0.2312 0.2285
CD test -2.4749 -1.5637 4.9547 -0.0134 -0.2654 1.0079 1.3218
Abs Corr 0.1884 0.217 0.2038 0.2189 0.2216 0.2393 0.2466
Int I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
POLS = Pooled OLS (with year dummies), 2FE = 2-way Fixed Effects, CCEP = Pooled Pesaran (2006) Common
Correlated Effects (CCE), CCEPt = CCEP with linear trend, MG = Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group (with
country trends), CMG = Pesaran (2006) CCE Mean Group, CMGt = CMG with country-specific linear trends, CMGt1
and CMGt2 = CMGt with, respectively, one and two extra cross-sectional averages lags, as indicated by Chudik and
Pesaran (2015).
CD-test reports the Pesaran (2004) test statistics, under the null of cross-section independence of the residuals. Int
indicates the order of integration of the residuals (I(0) - stationary, I(1) - nonstationary) obtained from Pesaran (2007)
CIPS test. RMSE presents the root mean squared error. Trend show the share of countries where the linear trend
is significant at 5%. lr-q and se-q represent respectively q’s long-run impact and its standard error. lr-rp and se-rp
represent respectively rp’s long-run impact and its standard error.
In order to assess problems arising from the dynamic structure of our equation,
this time we estimate an Error Correction Model (Table 2.6), where due to data
restrictions we are not able to include more than 30 countries. Although we present
the results for different estimators, given its larger flexibility, we focus on the ones
obtained from the CMG-style estimators (columns [4]-[7]). The first remarkable
fact is the presence of stationarity and cross-section independence in the residuals,
indicating the absence of the previous misspecification problems. Regarding the
impact of our variables of interest, we observe a negative impact of the Tobin’s
Q in both the short and long run. If we focus on the long run relationship (lr-q),
our estimates show that an increase of 1% in Tobin’s Q would decrease the labor
61
Chapter 2. Finance and the global decline of the labour share
income share between 0.072% and 0.11%. However, in contrast to Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014), we do not find any empirical support for the role played by
the relative prices which, from figure A1, is not a surprising result. This findings
support our theoretical model, and, like Chirinko and Mallick (2014a), discard the
decline of investment prices as a driver of the labor income share
In order to evaluate the relevance of the Tobin’s Q in the secular decline of the
labor income share, we undertake a simple simulation exercise. Given the fact that
the GDP weighted average Tobin’s Q in our sample has increased from a value of
1.15 in 1980 to a value of 1.68 in 2007 (46%), and that the labor income share has
evolved from a value of 57% to 52% (−8.9%), our results imply that the increase
in Tobin’s Q can explain between 41% and 57% of the labor income share decline.
2.5.4 Weak exogeneity test
Our analysis has dealt with the presence of endogeneity from common factors
driving both inputs and output. However, it is not uncommon in macroeconomics
to suffer from endogeneity due to reverse causality.20
Traditionally, the literature has used instrumental variable methods to solve this
problem. However, given the nature of our data, it is difficult to find a valid
set of instruments (i.e., variables which are correlated with the regressor but not
with the error term).21 Therefore, provided that our series are nonstationary and
cointegrated, we follow Canning and Pedroni (2008); and Eberhardt and Presbitero
(2015) to estimate an informal causality test based on the Granger Representation
Theorem (GRT). The GRT (Engle and Granger, 1987) states that cointegrated
20In our case, reverse causality implies that besides the relative prices and Tobin’s Q affecting
the labor income share, the labor income share has in turn, a significant impact on their values.
21Under the presence of unobservable common factors and parameter heterogeneity, the use
of internal instruments (lags of the variables) is not valid anymore.
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series can be represented in the form of an ECM, which in our case is:
∆lisit = α1i + λ11uˆi,t−j +
K∑
j=1
φ11ijlisi,t−j +
K∑
j=1
φ12ijqi,t−j
K∑
j=1
φ13ijrpi,t−j + 1it,
(2.31)
∆qit = α2i + λ21uˆi,t−j +
K∑
j=1
φ21ijlisi,t−j +
K∑
j=1
φ22ijqi,t−j
K∑
j=1
φ23ijrpi,t−j + 2it,
(2.32)
∆rpit = α3i + λ31uˆi,t−j +
K∑
j=1
φ31ijlisi,t−j +
K∑
j=1
φ32ijqi,t−j
K∑
j=1
φ33ijrpi,t−j + 3it,
(2.33)
where uˆit = lisit − βˆ1iqit + βˆ2irpit is the disequilibrium term. In order to identify
a long-run equilibrium relationship, the GRT requires at least one of the λ’s to
be nonzero. If λ11 6= 0, q and rp have a causal impact on the lis, if λ11, λ21, and
λ31 are nonzero, then all variables are determined simultaneously, and no causal
relationship can be identified.
Table 2.7 presents the results for our weak exogeneity test. Column “Model” refers
to the method used to estimate the disequilibrium term (uˆ). The two big blocks
“CA” and “no CA” indicate whether equations (2.31)-(2.33) include, or not, cross-
sectional averages of the variables. Within each block, the dependent variable of
the system is indicated at the top of the column. The information provided shows
the results for the average λ and its respective p-value. Regarding our previous
discussion, for a causal effect of the Tobin’s Q and the relative prices on the labor
share, λ11 should be different from 0, while λ21 = λ31 = 0. We find that just 5
out of 42 cases (highlighted with asterisks) are against a causal relationship in our
study. Therefore, we safely conclude that our analysis represents the causal impact
of Tobin’s Q and the relative price of investment on the labor income share.
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Table 2.7: Weak exogeneity test
no CA CA
Model lis q rp lis q rp
MG Avg. λ -0.52 -0.45 0.02 -0.50 -0.41 -0.04
ρ 0.00 0.03* 0.48 0.00 0.21 0.60
CMG Avg. λ -0.57 -0.40 -0.01 -0.51 -0.54 0.00
ρ 0.00 0.15 0.83 0.00 0.18 0.94
CMGt Avg. λ -0.75 -0.65 0.00 -0.69 -0.74 -0.04
ρ 0.00 0.01* 0.98 0.00 0.12 0.72
CMG1 Avg. λ -0.59 -0.23 0.04 -0.51 -0.58 0.03
ρ 0.00 0.52 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.61
CMGt1 Avg. λ -0.77 -0.12 0.06 -0.75 -0.60 0.05
ρ 0.00 0.75 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.38
CMG2 Avg. λ -0.73 -0.42 -0.07 -0.64 -1.04 -0.05
ρ 0.00 0.32 0.09* 0.00 0.04* 0.56
CMGt2 Avg. λ -0.93 -0.46 0.06 -0.82 -1.20 0.05
ρ 0.00 0.29 0.25 0.00 0.01* 0.44
Notes: Avg. λ shows the robust mean coefficient for the disequilibrium term on the ECM.
Asterisks highlight cases which do not support a causality relationship for our analysis.
2.6 Conclusion
The secular decline of the global labor share has received vivid attention in the
last years. We contribute to this recent literature by proposing a new mechanism
that links the evolution of the labor share with the evolution of equity Tobin’s Q.
In our model, an increase in equity Tobin’s Q boosts financial wealth pushing
investors to demand a higher return on equity. Firms are forced to slowdown
investment and, consequently, the capital-output ratio. This raises equity returns
but drives the labor share down when capital and labor are complements. That
way, our paper reconciles the labor share - capital-output framework with the
standard values of the elasticity of substitution (σ < 1).
We test the validity of our model estimating different Mean Group-style estimators
based on a common factor model. Results suggest that the global increase of
Tobin’s Q since 1980 accounts for between 41% and 57% of the decline in the labor
income share. When the relative price of investment is included in our estimations,
we find that they do not have any significant effect on the labor income share.
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Our results show that the relationship between financial markets and corporations,
embodied in the equity Tobin’s Q ratio, is crucial to understand the dynamics of
the capital-output ratio and factor shares. In light of our findings, we believe
that the decline in the labor income share is not the irreversible consequence of
technological or structural factors, like in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and
Piketty and Zucman (2014a), but the result of a change in the functioning of
financial markets and its relation with corporate investment decisions. According
to our model, policies aiming at reversing the trend in the labor share should
target incentives on corporate investment, even if this is at the expense of equity
valuation and equity returns. This could be achieved, for example, by imposing
higher taxes on corporate distributions, like dividends or share repurchases.
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APPENDIX: Supplementary tables and figures
Table A.1: Selected economies and sample period
id Country Sample period id Country Sample period
1 Australia 1980-2008 22 Luxembourg 1991-2008
2 Austria 1980-2008 23 Mexico 1988-2008
3 Belgium 1980-2008 24 Morocco 1998-2007
4 Brazil 1992-2008 25 Netherlands 1980-2008
5 Canada 1980-2008 26 New Zealand 1986-2008
6 Chile 1990-2008 27 Norway 1980-2007
7 China 1995-2007 28 Peru 1992-2003
8 Colombia 1993-2007 29 Philippines 1988-2008
9 Denmark 1980-2009 30 Poland 1995-2008
10 Finland 1987-2009 31 Portugal 1988-2009
11 France 1980-2009 32 South Africa 1980-2008
12 Germany 1983-2008 33 Spain 1986-2008
13 Greece 1988-2009 34 Sri Lanka 1994-2008
14 Hong Kong 1980-2003 35 Sweden 1982-2009
15 Hungary 1995-2008 36 Switzerland 1980-2007
16 India 1991-2008 37 Thailand 1988-2003
17 Ireland 1981-2008 38 Turkey 1990-2003
18 Israel 1993, 1995-2008 39 UK 1980-2008
19 Italy 1980-2008 40 US 1980-2008
20 Japan 1980-2007 41 Venezuela 1992-2006
21 Korea 1980-2003
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Raw variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LIS 915 0.468 0.096 0.214 0.636
Q 915 1.241 0.268 0.519 3.229
RP 915 1.041 0.097 0.767 1.413
Panel B: Regression variables (in logs)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lis 915 -0.785 0.234 -1.543 -0.452
q 915 0.195 0.200 -0.655 1.172
rp 915 0.036 0.092 -0.265 0.346
Figure A1: Labor income share against relative prices
Notes: Own calculation based on a sample of 41 countries and 911 observations. Variables
are demeaned to control for fixed-effects. Correlation coefficient= 0.11
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Imperfect Competition,
Secular Stagnation and Factor
Shares
Abstract
Secular stagnation is a term coined to describe the last 30-year period of lower economic
growth and declining interests rates. Among the potential causes of secular stagnation,
the rise of monopoly rents has gained increasing attention in the current policy debates
(Furman and Orszag, 2015; Summers, 2016; CEA, 2016). I build a growth model with
a corporate sector and imperfect competition and I show that the rise of monopoly
power in the labor and the goods market is indeed consistent with phenomena that have
characterized the post-1980 U.S. economy, namely, the rise of asset prices and corporate
profits, the slowdown of output and investment, the stagnation of wages and the decline
of the labor share. All of this, along with empirical indicators of increases in monopoly
power, might be taken as evidence that increasing market power is a central argument
to explain the evolution of the U.S. economy during the last three decades.
JEL Codes: E22, E25, E44
Keywords: Secular Stagnation, Monopoly Power, Investment, Tobin’s Q, Labor Share
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3.1 Motivation
In an influential speech at the 2013 IMF Annual Research Conference (Summers,
2013), Larry Summers suggested the possibility that advanced economies might be
suffering from secular stagnation. Secular stagnation is usually defined as a steady
downward tendency of the real interest rate, reflecting an imbalance between an
excess of desired saving and a decreasing propensity to invest (Eichengreen, 2015).
This imbalance would have resulted in a long-term period characterized by persis-
tent output gaps and lower rates of growth and inflation, only interrupted by short
cycles of bubbles and unsustainable growth. Whether advanced economies are suf-
fering from secular stagnation is itself a controversial debate. But the fact that
industrial economies have been experiencing a decline in long-term real interests
over the last three decades is hardly debatable (Desroches and Francis, 2006).
The literature has proposed several explanations for this phenomenon: a decline
in investment due to the lack of investment opportunities and low returns to
innovation (Gordon, 2012), an excess of savings due to a persistent liquidity trap
(Eggertsson and Mehrotra, 2014), a decline of the relative price of investment
goods (Thwaites, 2015) and, not less important, Hansen’s original theory of a
decline in the rate of population growth (Hansen, 1938).
Recently, the rise of market power has gained increasing attention as another po-
tential explanation for secular stagnation. Summers (2016) has wisely noted that
previous theories are hardly compatible with a phenomenon that have occurred
alongside the slowdown of growth and the decline of interest rates. I refer to the
secular increase in the stock market value of nonfinancial corporations.
If the economy is experiencing a secular rise in the market value of corporations, the
return to capital is expected to be unusually high as well, and one should expect
a parallel rise in new capital investment. But this is not what has happened.
Returns on stocks have increased by historical standards, but this has not been
accompanied by an increase in corporate investment which, with the exception
of the technological boom in the late 90s, also has displayed a downward trend.
Moreover, financial payouts in the form of dividends and equity buybacks have
trended up, consistent with the view that corporations have been cutting back on
investment to raise the returns on financial capital (Gruber and Kamin, 2015).
Quite striking from an economic perspective, the positive empirical relationship
of corporate cash flow and borrowing to productive investment has disappeared in
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the three decades, and has been replaced with a positive relation to shareholder
payouts (Mason, 2015).
The upswing of asset prices is not a uniquely U.S. phenomenon. The rise of stock
market wealth, as measured by Tobin’s Q ratio, is a common trend across industrial
economies. Not surprisingly, Piketty (2014) shows that asset prices and housing
wealth have been the most important drivers of the observed rising wealth-income
ratios in the advanced economies, although in the case of asset prices, the most
extremes cases are those of the anglo-saxon economies.
As Summers (2016) notes, there is not an immediate explanation for the divergence
between rising corporate profits and declining interest rates. If interests rates
reflect the prevailing return to capital, corporate profits should generally follow
their path. One possible explanation for the disparity between these two variables
is an increased prevalence of economic rents. An increase in market power could
explain why we observe higher profits and higher stock market valuations but
also lower investment and lower output growth. Furthermore, interest rates would
fall because investment demand is lower, which would explain the lack of any
correlation between borrowing and corporate investment.
Has monopoly power actually increased? Furman and Orszag (2015) and CEA
(2016) documents that i) many industries have become more concentrated, partly
because the U.S. economy comes from a major merger wave, (ii) there is a growing
disparity in returns to invested capital across corporations, iii) union membership
has declined, and iv) business formation has also declined. Summers (2016) adds
the possibility that new technologies might be favoring monopoly power by ex-
ploding increasing returns to scale, and he also emphasizes the increasing role of
institutional shareholders, which might have altered corporate incentives due to
the overlapping ownership of companies.
The rise of market power would have the additional merit of explaining some
striking trends in inequality. The rise of economic rents rises the capital share
above the level that conventional returns would imply. Consequently the labor
income share would decrease, adding another potential explanation to the recent
evolution of factor shares.
This paper is a first step in developing a theory about secular stagnation and
monopoly power. I build a standard growth model with imperfect competition
in the goods and labor market using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework. I
show that under certain conditions the model is a good at explaining the trends of
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investment, capital-output ratio, Tobin’s Q and the labor income share. Although
much more computational and calibration work should be done, the predictions
of the model are very explanatory and confirm the idea that market power might
have played an important role for secular stagnation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model and
some characterization of the equilibrium. Section 3.3 discusses the effects of market
power in light of model’s equations. Section 3.4 shows preliminary computational
findings. An 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
I consider a dynamic economy that consists of two types of households, capitalists
and workers. There are n varieties y1, ..., yn of goods which can be used either for
consumption or investment. Each variety is produced by a single firm which is
an effective monopolist in the consumption and investment goods market for its
particular commodity. The Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator is used so that each firm faces
a downward-sloping demand curve and benefit from constant monopoly markups.
Imperfect competition is also introduced in the labor market. Each of the firms
is a monopsonist employer that faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve and
maximizes its value by choosing the employment level.
Firms are owned by capitalists’ households, who make savings’ decisions and only
receive income from the ownership of stocks. At every period there is one equity
stock outstanding per firm. Therefore, the market clearing condition in the stock
market requires sjt = 1. Labor is solely provided by workers’ households. Like in
Gali et al. (2007), they do not own any asset and, therefore, they are just non-
Ricardian households who consume all their current labor income. Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) provide evidence of the importance for the aggregate economy of
such rule-of-thumb households in the U.S. and other industrialized economies.
Finally, although there is not a continuum of firms, I proceed by assuming that
individual firms do not have the ability to influence aggregate output and prices.
In this respect, I follow Acemoglu (2009).
3.2.1 Capitalists
An infinite lived representative capitalist household seeks to maximize
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Maxccjt,sjt
∞∑
t=0
βtu (Cct )
subject to
Cct =
(
n∑
j=1
(
ccjt
) ξ−1
ξ
) ξ
ξ−1
(3.1)
and
n∑
j=1
pjtc
c
jt +
n∑
j=1
vjtsjt+1 =
n∑
j=1
(vjt + djt) sjt ∀t (3.2)
Cct is a CES composite consumption aggregator with elasticity of substitution
ξ > 1. ccjt is the consumption level of good j, which can be purchased at price
pjt. sjt denotes the number of stocks of firm j held by the capitalist household at
period t. Stocks generate a dividend income djt and can be traded at any period
t at price vjt. Therefore, the value of the financial wealth owned by the capitalist
household at the end of each period t is
∑n
j=1 vjtsjt+1.
The problem above can be solved in two stages. In the first stage, the capitalist
households decide how to allocate a given financial income mct =
∑n
j=1 vjtsjt+1 −∑n
j=1 vjtsjt+1 among the different goods. This stage results in the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz relative demand function of good j equal to:
ccjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−ξ
Cct (3.3)
where Pt =
(∑n
j=1 p
1−ξ
jt
) 1
1−ξ .
During the second stage, the household solves the intertemporal problem deciding
how much he would like to spend on total consumption Cct and how many stocks
he would like to buy given the current financial income. This stage results in a
standard Euler equation which has to be satisfied for the returns of each firm’s
stocks:
u′ (Cct )
βu′
(
Cct+1
) = vjt+1+djt+1Pt+1vjt
Pt
(3.4)
Denoting u
′(Cct )
βu′(Cct+1)
as 1+r′t, using forward substitution and imposing the transver-
sality condition, we can express the real value of firm j’s stock at period t as the
stream of future dividends:
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vjt
Pt
=
∞∑
t=0
djt+1∏t
h=1 Pt+h (1 + rt+h)
(3.5)
3.2.2 Workers
Workers’ households only receive income from labor, and maximize total consump-
tion Cw. Since they are forced to consume all their current income, their problem
is static. To simplify the consumption-labor choice, I assume linear utility in con-
sumption. As in the case of capitalists, Cw is given by a CES aggregation function
of all the varieties. To make the labor supply problem as tractable as possible, I
assume that each workers’ households has n members and that each of them works
in a different sector, which resembles the idea that labor markets are segmented.
Disutility from labor is assumed to be the same across sectors. Therefore, the
problem of workers can be expressed as follows:
Maxcwjt,ljtC
w
t − γ
n∑
j=1
l1+θjt
1 + θ
(3.6)
subject to
Cwt =
(
n∑
j=1
(
cwjt
) ξ−1
ξ
) ξ
ξ−1
(3.7)
and
n∑
j=1
pjtc
w
jt =
n∑
j=1
wjtljt (3.8)
where θ is assumed to be positive. This problem can also be solved in two stages.
In the first stage, the household decides how to allocate a given labor income
mwt =
∑n
j=1wjtljt among the different goods. This stage results in a standard
Dixit-Stiglitz relative demand function of good j equal to:
cwjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−ξ
Cwt (3.9)
where Pt =
(∑n
j=1 p
1−ξ
jt
) 1
1−ξ . In the second stage, the household decides how
much labor he supplies. Since utility is linear in total consumption Cw, this stage
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results in the following tractable labor supply equation:
wjt
Pt
= γlθjt (3.10)
for all j. Note that the labor supply is upward-sloping if γ > 0 and θ > 0.
3.2.3 Firms
Each of the n varieties is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm. At
each period t, a typical firm j uses Kjt and labor Ljt to produce a differentiated
good Yjt with a CES production technology of the following type:
F (Kjt, Ljt) =
(
φK
σ−1
σ
jt + (1− φ)L
σ−1
σ
jt
) σ
σ−1
(3.11)
where φ is a distributional parameter and σ is the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital. Firm j purchases capital goods from each of the other firms.
Let ijh denote the flow of capital goods produced by firm h and puchased by firm
j. Firm’s j capital stock evolves according to the law of motion
Kjt+1 −Kjt = ijt − δKjt (3.12)
where gross investment ij is given at each period t by the CES aggregation function
ijt =
(
n∑
h=1
(ijht)
ξ−1
ξ
) ξ
ξ−1
(3.13)
Parameter ξ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between different goods
within the production process of firm j. Note that this parameter is the same as
the elasticity parameter in the CES composite consumption index. In principle,
the elasticities of consumption and investment demand functions may be different,
but this would open the door to the existence of multiple equilibria (Gali, 1996),
making the problem unnecessarily complex. Therefore, for simplicity, the elasticity
is assumed to be the same.
The problem of the firm can also be solved also in two stages. During the first
stage, firm j demands investment ijh to maximize the amount of gross investment
conditional on the amount of available resources mj:
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Maxijht
(
n∑
h=1
(ijht)
ξ−1
ξ
) ξ
ξ−1
(3.14)
subject to
n∑
h=1
phtijht = mjt (3.15)
where ph is the price of variety h. This problem results in a standard Dixit-Stiglitz
relative demand function of good h by firm j
(
ijht
ijzt
)−1
ξ
=
pht
pzt
(3.16)
which can be expressed in terms of gross investment ij by using the price index P :(
ijht
ijt
)−1
ξ
=
pht
Pt
(3.17)
Note that since the elasticity parameter is the same as the parameter in the house-
holds’ problem, the resulting price index P is also the same. Since all the firms
face the same problem, the demand of good h by all the firms, which I denote idh,
is given by the following sum:
idht =
n∑
j=1
ijht =
(
pht
Pt
)−ξ n∑
j=1
ijt =
(
pht
pt
)−ξ
iTt (3.18)
where iTt is total gross investment in the economy. Note also that idjand ij refer to
different concepts. While the former refers to the total amount of good j demanded
by the whole firms’ sector, the latter refers to the gross investment decided by the
firm j.
During the second stage, firms choose the levels of capital and employment that
maximize their real value. Since they are monopolies in the goods market and
monopsonies in the labor market, they internalize the demand for goods and the
supply of labor respectively. Total demand of good j is given by the sum of the
capitalists’, workers’ and firms’ individual demands for variety j:
yj = i
dj + cwj + c
c
j =
(pj
P
)−ξ (
iT + Cw + Cc
)
(3.19)
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where Cwt + Cct + iTt = yTt is merely the aggregate demand of the whole economy.
The supply of labor faced by firm j is given by equation 3.10. Given that capital
Kj is the only individual state, the optimization problem of the firm, expressed in
recursive formulation, is:
V (Kj) = MaxK′j ,Lj
{
dj
P
+
V
(
K ′j
)
1 + r′
}
(3.20)
subject to the following constraints
dj = pjF (Kj, Lj)− wjLj −
n∑
h=1
phijh (3.21)
pj
P
=
(
yj
yT
)−1
ξ
(3.22)
n∑
h=1
phijh = ijP (3.23)
ij = K
′
j − (1 + δ)Kj (3.24)
wj
P
= γLθj (3.25)
where, to make the problem of the firms consistent with that of the households,
1
1+r′ equals the discount factor of capitalists. Equation 3.21 is the flow and funds
constraint of firm j. Equation 3.22 is the total demand of variety j. Equation
3.23 results from the combination of the investment demand in equation 3.17
and the price index Pt =
(∑n
j=1 p
1−ξ
jt
) 1
1−ξ . Equation 3.24 is the law if motion of
capital. Lastly, equation 3.25 is the labor supply. Since firm j is monopsonist
employer, he internalizes the entire supply of labor in sector j and chooses the
level of employment Lj. The problem of firm j results in the following first-order
conditions for labor and capital respectively:
wj
P
=
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)(
1
1 + θ
)
pjFL(Kj, Lj)
P
(3.26)
P (1 + r′) =
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
p′jFK(K
′
j, L
′
j) + P
′ (1− δ) (3.27)
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The presence of ξ adjusts the FOCs of both labor and capital. The deviation from
competitive behavior affects the equilibrium wage and return to capital and gives
a constant mark-up equal to 1
1− 1
ξ
, which measures the degree of monopoly power
in the goods market. When the elasticity ξ increases, the degree of substitution
between varieties increases and the degree of monopoly of a particular sector j falls,
bringing the real interest and the real wage closer to the marginal productivities.
The presence of θ only adjusts the FOC of labor. The deviation from competitive
behavior in the labor market introduces an additional wedge between the real wage
and the marginal productivity of labor which measures the degree of monopsony
power. Note that given the preference structure of workers’ households, 1
θ
measures
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage, keeping the marginal
utility of wealth constant. That is, 1
θ
is the Frisch elasticity that captures the pure
substitution effect of a change in the real wage. Since the utility of consumption
is linear, wealth effects are absent and -for a given γ- the paramenter θ alone
determines the shape of the labor supply. The higher θ, the lower is the elasticity
of the labor supply. The labor supply is then more vertical and the degree of
monopsony power, measured by the constant mark-up 1 + θ, is higher.
As shown below, both ξ and θ have important implications in the dynamics of
capital accumulation, asset prices and factor shares.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
Given the firms’ symmetry existing in the model, all firms make the same invest-
ment decision, produce the same quantity and set the same price. Accordingly,
ijt = it, idjt = idt , cwjt = cwt , ccjt = cct , Ljt = Lt, Kjt = Kt, wjt = wt, yjt = yt, pjt = pt,
djt = dt, vjt = vt for all j and all t. Since each firm charges the same price, the
price index P can be computed as
Pt = N
−1
ξ−1pt (3.28)
Since each firm produce the same quantity and the equilibrium demand p
P
=(
y
yT
)−1
ξ holds in equibrium, aggregate output can be computed as yT
yTt = N
ξ
ξ−1yt (3.29)
77
Chapter 3. Imperfect Competition, Secular Stagnation and Factor Shares
Market clearing in the goods market requires
F (Kt, Lt) = i
d
t + c
w
t + c
c
t ∀t (3.30)
Market clearing in the assets market requires
st = 1 ∀t (3.31)
The market clearing condition in the labor market is expressed in equation 3.25,
where the amount of labor supplied by households, ljt, has been replaced by the
employment level Ljt chosen by the firm.
Definition 3.1. An equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of prices {pt, vt, wt}∞t=0
and allocations of consumption, asset holdings, investment, dividends, labor and
capital {cwt , cct , st+1, it, dt, Lt, Kt+1}∞t=0 such that
1. Given K0 and prices, {it, dt, Lt, Kt+1}∞t=0 solve the problem of each firm.
2. Given prices and dt, {cct , st+1}∞t=0 solve the problem of the capitalists house-
hold.
3. Given prices and Lt, {cwt }∞t=0 solve the problem of the workers household.
4. The allocations {cwt , cct , st+1, it, Lt, Kt+1} are such that all markets clear at
each period t.
Note that in absecence of monopsony power in the labor market (i.e. when the
firms do not internalize the upward-sloping labor supply and/or when θ is zero)1
and in absence of monopoly power in the goods market (i.e. when the elasticity ξ
tends to infinity and, therefore, the varieties are perfect substitutes), the imperfect
competition frictions dissapear from the first order conditions, markups are equal
to 1 and the model collapses to the standard neoclassical growth model. On the
contrary, when θ and ξ are positive and finite, the equilibrium allocation differs
from the perfectly competitive allocation. But also in this case, since markups are
constant, the economy would be characterized by the existence of a unique steady
state and the corresponding capital accumulation dynamics would be qualitatitive
1When θ = 0, the real wage wp is constant and equal to γ but the firm proceed by adjusting
the employment level.
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similar to those obtained with the frictionless canonical model. The interesting
analysis, however, is to see how the economy responds to changes in the degree of
competition. In particular, whether the equilibrium dynamics are qualititatively
similar to those observed in the U.S. economy is a crucial question if one desires
to consider monopoly power as plausible hypothesis for secular stagnation. The
remaining sections of the paper are devoted to address this question.
3.2.5 Some characterization of the equilibrium
Proposition 3.2. If the production function displays constant returns to scale,
the long-run equilibrium with no inflation is characterized by the following Tobin’s
Q:
Qt = 1 +
∑∞
t=0
(θwt+1Lt+1)+
1
ξ (pF (Kt+1,Lt+1))∏t
h=1(1+rt+h)
PKt+1
(3.32)
Proof. Using the FOC with respect to capital 3.27 in non-recursive form and mul-
tiplying both sides by Kt+1, we get
PtKt+1 =
(
ξ−1
ξ
)
pt+1Kt+1FK(Kt+1, Lt+1) +Kt+1Pt+1 (1− δ)
1 + rt+1
(3.33)
Using the CRS assumption and the FOC with respect to labor 3.26, we get the
following decomposition of firm’s output:
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
F (Kt+1, Lt+1) =
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
Kt+1FK(Kt+1, Lt+1) +
wt+1Lt+1(1 + θ)
pt+1
(3.34)
c
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Combining 3.33 and 3.34 and using constraints 3.21, 3.23 and 3.24, the following
expression for the replacement cost of capital is obtained:
PtKt+1 =
dt+1 + Pt+1Kt+2 −
(
1
ξpt+1F (Kt+1, Lt+1)
)
− (θwt+1Lt+1)
1 + rt+1
(3.35)
Using forward substitution and imposing the no-inflation condition:
PKt+1 =
∞∑
t=0
dt+1∏t
h=1 (1 + rt+h)
−
∞∑
t=0
(
1
ξpF (Kt+1, Lt+1)
)
+ (θwt+1Lt+1)∏t
h=1 (1 + rt+h)
(3.36)
In absence of inflation, equation 3.5 becomes
vt =
∞∑
t=0
dt+1∏t
h=1 (1 + rt+h)
(3.37)
Then, by combining 3.36 and 3.37
vt = PKt+1 +
 ∞∑
t=0
(
1
ξpF (Kt+1, Lt+1)
)
+ (θwt+1Lt+1)∏t
h=1 (1 + rt+h)
 (3.38)
and Tobin’s Q, which is the ratio vt
PKt+1
results in equation 3.32.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the equity value (I abstract here from non-equity
liabilities) and the replacement cost of capital. Equation 3.32 indicates that mod-
erate levels of monopoly power in the goods and labor market would result in a
Tobin’s Q larger than one. In that case, the stock market value would be capturing
not only the market value or replacement cost of the existing physical capital, but
also the discounted sum of the future monopoly rents. Therefore, monopoly rents
show up as capital gains.
To understand the nature of these rents, note that they represent the amount of
total value added by a firm once conventional returns to capital are considered,
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the wage bill has been paid, the depreciated capital has been restored. To see this,
note that the total output of a firm can be descomposed into the following sum:
pF (K,L) = L
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
pFL(K,L) +K
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
pFK(K,L) +
1
ξ
pF (K,L) (3.39)
where the first term in the RHS of 3.39 can be decomposed using 3.26 into the
wage bill and the monopsony rent, that is;
L
(
ξ − 1
ξ
)
pFL(K,L) = Lw + θLw (3.40)
and where the second term K
(
ξ−1
ξ
)
pFK(K,L) represents the sum of the conven-
tional returns and the replacement of depreciated capital.
Equation 3.40 implies that monopsony rents in the labor market can be equal or
larger than the wage bill itself. This is certainly the case when θ is larger than one.
But θ ≥ 1 is not the result that one should reasonably expect. Even in presence of
imperfect competition in the labor market, the wage bill should be considerably
higher that the monopsony rents, suggesting that realistic magnitudes of θ should
be much lower than 1. This is consistent with macro estimates of the Frisch
elasticity, which are often in the range of 2 to 4, implying values of θ between
0.25 and 0.5. In any case, note that the present structure of workers’ preferences,
where consumption enters in linear form, might exacerbate the value of θ. This is
because, in abscence of wealth effects that make the labor supply more inelastic,
the inelasticity required to obtain certain levels of monopsony rents can only be
achieved by decreasing the substitution effect (that is, by increasing θ).
Proposition 3.3. For any given r, the steady state is characterized by more capital
K when the economy is more competitive if ξ
ξ−1 <
1
lnN
.
Proof. Using the FOC with respect to capital 3.27 and imposing the steady state
condition, we define function G like
G (K, ξ) =
P (r + δ)
p
−
(
1− 1
ξ
)
FK(K,L) = N
1
1−ξ (r + δ)−
(
1− 1
ξ
)
FK(K,L) (3.41)
Applying the implicit function theorem, we have that
dK
dξ
=
−
(
∂G
∂ξ
)
(
∂G
∂K
) = −
(
(r + δ) 1
(1−ξ)2N
1
1−ξ lnN − 1
ξ2
FK(K,L)
)
−
(
1− 1
ξ
)
FKK(K,L)
(3.42)
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Using the FOC with respect to capital and operating, it is straightforward to see
that the numerator is positive for any N > 1 only if ξ
ξ−1 <
1
lnN
. The denominator
of 3.42 is always positive because ξ > 1 and FKK(K,L) < 0. Therefore, dKdξ is
positive for any N > 1 and ξ such that ξ
ξ−1 <
1
lnN
.
The previous proposition implies that a growing market power, manifested by
higher markups in the market for goods, reduces the capital stock when the con-
dition ξ
ξ−1 <
1
lnN
is satisfied. This condition imposes the upper bound 1
lnN
to the
markup level ξ
ξ−1 . For example, when N = 1, any possible markup gives a positive
relation between the elasticity ξ and the steady state capital stock. When N = 2,
the highest possible markup is 1.443, which requires an elasticity ξ at least equal
to 3.26. Note that since the markup cannot be lower than one -which occurs when
ξ tends to infinity-, the maximum number of varieties required to have dKss
dξ
> 0
and ξ
ξ−1 ≥ 1 is N = exp(1). Using the FOC with respect to labor and applying
again the implicit function theorem, one can easily deduce that the same condition
should hold to have dL
dξ
> 0.
The idea that the U.S. economy has been stuck in a period of low investment
and weak economic growth due to the rise of monopoly power is consistent with
the previous proposition. This is also consistent with the observed decline of
the physical-capital-output ratio shown in Gonzalez (2016b) and the idea, em-
phasized by Stiglitz (2015), that the rise of monopoly rents can be accompanied
by a decrease in productive capital, leading to the stagnation or decrease in the
mean marginal productivity or average wage of workers. The prediction of the
model with respect to labor seems to be also reasonable. The evolution of the
employment-population ratio, as shown by Glaeser (2014), illustrates that employ-
ment growth has been quite sluggish coinciding with the period usually considered
in secular stagnation debates, namely, the post-1980 years.
3.3 The Rise of Monopoly Power and its Effects.
As mentioned before, the post-1980 period has been characterized by an astonish-
ing rise of stock market wealth, as measured by Tobin’s q ratio of the corporate
sector. Also, the ratio of the market value of equities to corporate gross value
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added has been unusually high and it has followed a trend similar to Tobin’s Q.2
The rate of profitability in the U.S. corporate sector, therefore, has been very high
and so has been the share of corporate value added going to capital.
These facts might be considered as evidence that investment has been highly
profitable and this high payoff should have acted as an incentive to invest in
more capital. But this is not what has happened. On the contrary, we know
that the U.S. economy has suffered low economic growth, a decline in investment
propensity and low real interest rates by historical standards.
Given these facts, the rise of corporate monopoly power emerges as a plausible
explanation for this apparent puzzle. To see this, first note that an increase in
monopoly power can explain the decline of capital accumulation. Proposition 3.3
clearly shows that when the degree of monopoly, measured by markup ξ
ξ−1 , rises,
capital stock can be lower in the steady state.
Monopoly power can also explain the evolution of Tobin’s Q ratio. When monopoly
power rises, monopoly rents boost asset prices driving Tobin’s Q upwards. In
that case, Tobin’s Q is rising due to higher profits, but these profits do not grow
reflecting improves in the productivity of capital, but increases in monopoly rents.
To see this, we can use the steady state equation of Tobin’s Q:
Qt = 1 +
θγLθ+1
rK
+
1
ξ
F (K,L)N
1
ξ−1
rK
(3.43)
where I have used γLθ and N
1
ξ−1 instead of the real wage w
P
and the price relation
p
P
respectively. When θ = 0 (i.e. when the labor supply is completely elastic)
and when ξ tends to infinity (i.e. when the demand of each variety is completely
elastic), imperfect competition frictions dissapear, the second and third terms of
3.43 become zero and steady state Tobin’s Q equals one. In absence of monopoly
rents, the model achieves the same equilibrium than the frictionless version of
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) model.
2This fact casts some doubts on intangible capital as one of the usual candidates to explain the
post-1980 trend of Tobin’s Q. Intangible capital might not be properly measured in aggregate
corporate fixed assets (although, for example, BEA data includes stocks of R&D and other
forms intellectual property products), and this mismeasurement could explain why Tobin’s Q
has gone upwards during periods of high intangible investment. If that were the case, since the
contribution of intangible capital is properly captured in corporate gross value added, we should
have observed a roughly constant ratio of the stock market value to corporate gross value added.
This is not what has happened. This ratio has followed a very similar trend to Tobin’s Q (see
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=3YJg)
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Although monopoly power has a clear positive effect in Tobin’s Q, this effect is
not so evident in the stock market value itself. To see this, note that the steady
state equity value in real terms is:
v
P
= K +
(
1
ξ
pF (K,L)
P
)
+
(
θwL
P
)
r
(3.44)
When monopoly power increases, the discounted value of future monopoly rents
increases but, due to the negative effect on K that proposition 3.3 shows, the final
effect on v
P
might turn out to be negative. Whether the rise of the rents offset the
decline of productive capital is a question that can be determined computationally,
using a standard parametrization of the model. I do this in the next section.
The model can also be used to test if the change in the factor shares can be
explained with the rise of monopoly rents. Different causes can be behind the
decline of the labor share. Recent research has pointed out the evolution of the
price of capital goods (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), the shift towards a more
IPP intensive economy (Dongya Koh and Zheng, 2015), the offshoring of the labor-
intensive component of the U.S. economy (Elsby et al., 2013) and mechanisms
-other than monopoly power- that alter the Tobin’s Q, like the capital income tax
(Gonzalez, 2016b). But up to now, the literature has not discussed the possibility
that monopoly rents have contributed to the decline of the labor share.3
Among the scarce literature, Raurich et al. (2012) show that when markups are
ignored, the estimates of the elasticity of substitution in the U.S. are downward
biased because of a misspecification of the output elasticity of labor. Stiglitz (2016)
suggests that monopoly rents might explain the divergence between wealth and
productive capital. In a context of imperfect competition, monopoly rents would
swell asset prices as a form of unproductive wealth and this would be perfectly
compatible with a decline of productive capital. In addition to the substraction
of unproductive rents, the decline of the productive-capital ratio would also drive
the labor share down for standard values of the elasticity of substitution.
Finally, very recently, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA, 2016) has exam-
ined policies that can strengthen productivity while addressing inequality, and
3In a recent press article, Solow discusses monopoly rents as the source of diver-
gence between productivity and wages. The article is available at https://psmag.com/
the-future-of-work-why-wages-aren-t-keeping-up-6fcfac468e4.h0ty5j7av
84
Chapter 3. Imperfect Competition, Secular Stagnation and Factor Shares
their diagnosis suggests that much of the rise in inequality stem from cases in
which markets have become less competitive. Among different pieces of evidence,
they underline two. First, union power and union membership have declined con-
sistently since the late 1970s. Wages and average labor productivity were evolving
at a similar growth rate before the late 1970s (Mishel et al., 2012). Therefore,
the fact that they have decoupled from each other since then could indicate that
unions were an important levelling mechanism. With a decline of their power,
the balance would have been tilted towards firms. Second, they show that there
has been increased market concentration across a number of industries, consistent
with increasing shares of revenue earned by the largest firms. That way, market
concentration can easily explain the striking return to capital obtained by major
corporations.
There are two principal channels through which rents could increase factorial in-
equality. To see this, note from equations 3.39 and 3.40 that, in absence of inflation,
the labor share equals:
wL
py
=
1− rPK − δPK − 1
ξ
pF (K,L)− θLw
py
(3.45)
When monopoly rents increase, the terms 1
ξ
pF (K,L) and θLw increase at the
expense of wages and the rental rate of capital. The first term resembles the
additional rents obtained from increasing concentration in the goods market. The
second term, θLw, is the rent that workers lose when firms increase its monopsony
power and it resembles the lost of union’s power. In the context of the model, they
represent the two channels subject of concern in CEA (2016). However, there is an
indirect "technology channel" which also affects the labor share. When monopoly
power increases, the stock of capital falls, having an impact on wages through the
marginal productivity of labor. If capital and labor are complements, this also has
negative impact on the labor share.4 From Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), we
know that this happens if the environment is characterized by a CES technology
and σ < 1. The two mechanisms will be present in the computational exercise
below.
4The opposite would occur if capital and labor were substitutes. In that case, the technology
channel would go in opposite direction to the effect of rents.
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3.4 Findings
The goal of this section is to evaluate the quantitative effects of a permanent
monopoly power shock. The exercise is not intended to replicate exactly the series
of interest. That would required a fully-fledged calibration and the consideration
of other different shocks. The exercise only aims to show whether monopoly power
can give rise to dynamics similar in sign and shape to those observed for the U.S.
economy.
Since I am mostly interested in the effects of markups, I proceed by assuming that
there is only one variety. That way, I manage to abstract from the effect that a rise
of monopoly power can have on the "love-for-variety" externality, captured in the
relative price relation Pt = N
−1
ξ−1pt. In addition, I assume that the labor market
is competitive and labor supply is inelastic. Therefore, the source of monopoly
power only comes from the goods market.5 The parameter values I use are in the
range of those found in other studies:
β µ φ δ σ
0.98 2 0.4 0.08 0.7
Starting at t = 0, the elasticity ξ evolves according to the linear adjustment path
ξt = max {ξ −∆t, ξ′}
which is perfectly anticipated by households. Parameter ∆ has chosen to be 0.5
to have a relatively smooth adjustment to the new steady state.6 ξ and ξ′ are
chosen to be 20 and 10 respectively. These values are consistent with the range of
estimated markups for the U.S., which in terms of gross output vary between 1.05
and 1.15 (Jaimovich, 2007). Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics when the economy
transits between the two steady states.
Figure 3.1 plots the series of labor share, output, Tobin’s Q, capital-ouput ratio,
equity-output ratio and return to capital. As can be seen from the figure, out-
put falls but capital falls even more, which drives the capital-output ratio down
5The reason for this is that asset prices and Tobin’s Q are extremely sensitive to small changes
of θ when realistic values of the Frisch elasticity are considered. This make me thing that the
modelling strategy of the labor market exacerbates the impact of monopsony markups. Quali-
tatively, however, the impact of θ on assets prices is properly captured by Tobin’s Q equation
3.32
6In a proper calibration, ∆ should be chosen to match the length of Tobin’s Q adjustment.
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to a new lower steady state. This is the computational counterpart of propo-
sition 3.3. This decline is consistent with the evolution, in real terms, of the
corporate-physical-capital-output ratio observed in the U.S. economy (see figure
1.8 in Gonzalez, 2016b), although the magnitude of the decline is small compared
to the data.
Despite the decline of real investment and capital stock, the real value of the cor-
porate sector grows notably when markups increase. This is perhaps the strongest
evidence in favor of market power as a plausible story for secular stagnation. The
decoupling between firms’ profitability and the lack of new capital investment is
here captured by the endogenous response of Tobin’s Q. As expected, the equity-
output ratio response follows a very similar trajectory, a fact that is also observed
in the data. This result, which is absolutely predictable from the context of the
model, is quite relevant from the point of view of the policy debate. This is be-
cause the joint evolution of Tobin’s Q and the equity-output ratio would back the
"market power" narrative against the alternative argument according to which the
evolution of asset prices can be explained thanks to the rise of intangible capital
(see footnote 2).
There is, however, substantial divergence between the Tobin’s Q and asset prices
values generated by the model and the empirical counterparts (see figure 1.3 in
Gonzalez (2016b)). First, note that steady state Tobin’s Qs are substantially
higher than those observed in the data. This is because the model, by construction,
has a lower bound at Q = 1 and, more importantly, because asset prices become
very sensitive to markup levels. The value of firms’ equity reflects not only the
value of its productive capital, but also the future monopoly rents, which are
perfectly anticipated and, therefore, can be very high in relation to their current
capital. Second, U.S. Tobin’s Q series has been growing but the evolution differs
quite remarkably from the Tobin’s Q generated by the model. Whereas Tobin’s
Q in the data started growing slowly and soared during the late 1980s, the model
predicts a rapid growth during the first years and a subsequent slowdown. This
is because monopoly power has not followed a linear path and, more importantly,
because -again- perfect foresight permit agents to anticipate the value of future
monopoly rents, and this has a higher impact on immediate asset values.
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Figure 3.1: Transition dynamics: Labor Share and Tobins Q
The model also predicts an increase in corporate capital returns which, from figure
1.5 in Gonzalez (2016b)), we know that have also been increasing in the U.S. since
the early 80s. The predicted increase is small compared to what we observe in the
data, but the model abstracts from capital income tax and stock market costs,
which have also changed a lot during the recent period. Importantly, the return to
capital reverts to its original steady state value because, at the steady state, the
return is always stuck at 1
β
− 1. This would be the main difference with respect
to Anagnostopoulos et al. (2012) where, more realistically, the return to capital
move from one steady state to another steady state along an increasing demand
of assets.
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The model is also consistent with the widely discussed evolution of the U.S. labor
share. Figure 3.2 plots the series of the labor share (in blue) and the value of the
labor share that would have prevailed if workers had kept the subtracted rents
(in red). The labor share falls because i) the size of the monopoly rent increase
in relation to the marginal productivity of labor and because ii) the marginal
productivity of labor itself falls more than the level of output. The first effect is
purely distributional. The second effect captures an allocative change but that
also has distributional implications.
Figure 3.2: Labor share decomposition
To understand these two effects, note that, since firms’ technology is CES, the
marginal productivity of labor to output can be expressed in terms of the capital-
output ratio:
LFL(K,L)
y
= 1− φ
(
K
y
)
σ−1
σ (3.46)
Accordingly, the labor share can be expressed in terms of K
y
and ξ:
wL
py
=
(
1− 1
ξ
)(
1− φ
(
K
y
)
σ−1
σ
)
(3.47)
The total decline of the labor share is captured by the blue line. A decrease in
the elasticity from 20 to 10, which represents an increase in the markup of 5.6 per
cent, causes a decline in the labor share of 5.9 per cent. To isolate the effect of the
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capital-output ratio, I simulate the labor share leaving constant the proportional
size of the rent 1/ξ but allowing the capital stock to move according to the implied
transition. This series is given by the red line in figure 3.2. Not surprisingly, the
shape of this series is very similar to the capital-output ratio series. This is because
the elasticity of substitution is ξ = 0.70, which implies complementarity between
capital and labor and a corresponding positive relation between K
y
and LFL(K,L)
y
(see equation 3.46). However, the simulated labor share only declines 0.6092 per
cent, implying a very small effect of the capital-output ratio (note that axes in
figure 3.2 have different scales). The reason for this limited effect is twofold. On
one hand, the effect that the change in ξ has on the capital-output ratio is limited
itself. Figure 3.1 shows that the capital-output ratio transits from 2.53 to 2.44,
implying a decline of 3.88 per cent, which is still small compared to what we have
observed in the U.S. On the other hand, our value of σ, which presumes a relatively
high degree of complementarity, might not be low enough. Indeed, the preferred
estimate in Chirinko and Mallick (2014b) is 0.4. In that case, the implied effect of
the capital-output ratio on the labor share would have been substantially higher.
In any case, the model is able to disentangle between the two channels. Because
of that, it is a convenient framework where to include other important frictions
(like capital income taxes) and conduct a better calibration, in order to distin-
guish between the distributional effects of pure allocative changes and the pure
distributional implications of monopoly power.
3.5 Conclusion
Is monopoly power a reasonable explanation for secular stagnation? The analy-
sis of this paper suggests that it is. I propose a growth model that incorporates
imperfect competition in the goods and labor market. Within the context of the
model, I derive an expression for Tobin’s Q in terms of future monopoly rents and
I show that, under certain conditions and for a given return to capital, a higher
degree of monopoly power implies lower output and lower capital stock. More
importantly, the model predicts phenomena that have actually happened during
the last three decades in the U.S. economy. In response to an increase of monopoly
markups within the range of values found by the literature, the model generates
convincing series of asset prices, Tobin’s Q, returns to capital, the capital-output
and the equity-output ratios, and the labor income share. The model is good
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at explaining why firms have become more profitable while decreasing the invest-
ment on new capital, although asset prices are be very sensitive to markup changes
whereas capital and output are very little. The model also provides a good frame-
work to study the distributional aspects of secular stagnation caused by monopoly
power because it is able to disentangle between the pure distributional effects of
monopoly power and the distributional implications of the allocative effects of
monopoly power. These results, along with the existing evidence of increases in
monopoly power, suggests that market power deserves increased attention to un-
derstand the last decades of the U.S. and, possibly, other advance economies. This
model only pretends to be a very first step in that direction.
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